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Based on the landmark 1961 Supreme Court decision, Aro 
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., the long 
held wisdom in patent law has been that there is no heart or gist of 
the invention.  In other words, patent law does not attribute any 
special significance to a particular subset of claim limitations 
regardless of how important those limitations are.  Under Aro, 
judges and juries are told that they need to view all the limitations, 
even stock components, with equal significance.  They must resist 
focusing on the heart of the invention when making any decision. 
Aro’s commandment has spread far beyond the doctrine of 
repair and reconstruction, the subject matter of Aro.  In fact, it has 
become a basic tenet of patent law and has been adopted by the 
doctrines of infringement, anticipation, obviousness, and the 
written description requirement.  To this day, judges and 
commentators continue to cite to Aro and proclaim that patent law 
does not recognize the heart of the invention. 
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom as neither 
accurate nor wise.  It is not accurate because other doctrines 
unwittingly consider the heart of invention while using different 
nomenclature.  For example, the doctrines of contributory 
infringement and inequitable conduct do not openly challenge Aro, 
yet they rely on the “material part of the invention” and “point of 
novelty” respectively.  Aro’s commandment is unwise because a 
rule against considering the heart of the invention is bad policy.  
On a purely intuitive level, it is entirely sensible for judges and 
juries to focus on the heart of the invention in making their 
decisions.  This Article demonstrates why this intuition is correct 
by analyzing how different patent law doctrines rightly and 
wrongly rely on the heart of invention. 
The Article then provides a framework for determining when 
the heart of the invention should and should not be considered.  
Applying this framework to various areas of patent law, this 
Article explains: 1) why the fifty years of jurisprudence in the 
doctrine of repair and reconstruction is wrong; 2) why the heart of 
the invention may be a permissible consideration in various 
developing areas of patent law including subject matter 
patentability; and 3) how the Supreme Court got it “almost” right 
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in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., when it decided 
that the “essential features” (another pseudonym for the heart of 
the invention) was an important consideration within the doctrine 
of patent exhaustion. 
INTRODUCTION 
For almost fifty years, the Supreme Court’s decision in Aro 
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.1 has been 
the foundation for one of the basic commandments in patent law: 
there is no legally recognizable heart of an invention in 
combination patents.2  In other words, patent law does not attribute 
any significance to a subset of claim limitations regardless of how 
important those limitations are; it looks at all the limitations 
together.  Imagine a computer patent that shows how to speed up 
the microprocessor.  Under Aro, judges and juries are told that they 
cannot focus on what makes the microprocessor faster and that 
they need to view all the limitations, even stock components (e.g., 
memory, mouse, and display), with equal significance.  They must 
resist focusing on the heart of the invention when making any 
decision.  Although Aro’s commandment was only one factor used 
to develop a new standard for the doctrine of repair and 
reconstruction, it has found its way into numerous other doctrines 
in patent law including infringement, anticipation, obviousness, 
and the written description requirement.  Moreover, Aro continues 
to influence the thinking in other developing doctrines. 
More recently, the Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.3 showed that Aro’s 
commandment is not absolute.  In Quanta, the Supreme Court 
found that the doctrine of patent exhaustion could apply to the sale 
of a product even though it does not contain all the elements of the 
patented invention.4  So long as the “essential features” are present, 
 
 1 365 U.S. 336 (1961). 
 2 Id. at 344–45 (“[T]here is no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, 
‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination patent.”). 
 3 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). 
 4 See id. at 2120–21 (“The sale of a device that practices patent A does not, by virtue 
of practicing patent A, exhaust patent B.  But if the device practices patent A while 
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that is sufficient.5  Thus, unlike Aro, Quanta plainly recognizes 
that a subset of key claim limitations (i.e., the heart of the 
invention) can have legal significance. 
This Article critically explores how different doctrines in 
patent law have addressed the heart of the invention, in many cases 
using different nomenclature.  The issue has arisen in many 
contexts beyond the doctrines of repair and reconstruction (Aro) 
and exhaustion (Quanta).  It cuts a broad swath across patent law.  
The doctrines of infringement, anticipation, obviousness, the 
written description requirement, contributory infringement, 
inequitable conduct, joint inventorship, patentable subject matter, 
and enablement have all contemplated whether it is appropriate to 
consider the heart of the invention within their particular areas. 
After exploring these far ranging doctrines, the author has 
come to the surprising conclusion that nearly fifty years of 
jurisprudence is wrong in several respects.  First, courts and 
commentators inaccurately cite to Aro as if it presides over all of 
patent law.  It does not.  The heart of the invention is considered in 
several different doctrines, albeit using different nomenclature.  
Second, rejecting the heart of the invention in Aro was both bad 
jurisprudence and policy.  The Supreme Court incorrectly relied on 
precedent that had already been legislatively overruled by the 
Patent Act of 1952.6  Moreover, subsequent repair and 
reconstruction decisions have shown that applying Aro’s standard 
can lead to absurd results. 
This Article does not recommend a complete reversal of Aro’s 
commandment.  Rather, it provides an analytical framework for 
determining when it is appropriate to reject the heart of the 
invention and when it is not.  The current framework of making 
 
substantially embodying patent B, its relationship to patent A does not prevent exhaustion 
of patent B.”). 
 5 Id. at 2116–17 (“‘[W]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it 
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his 
patent, and has destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the 
patent, he has sold his invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that particular 
article.’” (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1942))). 
 6 See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 100–376 (2006)); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of 
Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 72 & n.105 (2010); infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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that decision based on the particular label used to describe the 
heart of the invention is obviously wrong.  The heart of the 
invention should not be considered when the law needs to 
determine when something falls within the boundaries outlined by 
a patent’s claims.  In these situations, it is entirely appropriate to 
apply what is known as the “all elements” rule.  However, the “all 
elements” rule is a subtly different concept than the “heart of the 
invention.”  The former rule recognizes that patent law defines the 
property rights of a patent by looking at all its claim limitations.7  
In contrast, considering the heart of the invention suggests that 
courts should focus on certain “key” claim limitations when 
deciding particular issues.  When the law is not seeking to 
determine when something falls within the boundaries outlined by 
a patent’s claim, it may be appropriate to focus on the heart of the 
invention. 
This framework is useful for two reasons.  First, it can identify 
when certain existing doctrines have gone wrong.  For example, 
the doctrine of repair and reconstruction does not assess whether 
one patent infringes another.8  Thus, this framework suggests that 
the heart of the invention may be a proper consideration there.  
Second, a sound framework can help the courts understand when 
the heart of the invention should be considered in developing areas 
of patent law.  Even now, there are several areas in patent law that 
are developing; whether the heart of the invention is an appropriate 
consideration is still yet to be determined.  Just recently, the 
Supreme Court implicitly allowed courts to consider the heart of 
the invention when determining whether the subject matter of an 
 
 7 See Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(noting that the “all elements rule” “holds that an accused product or process is not 
infringing unless it contains each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an 
equivalent”).  The “all elements rule” is sometimes called the “all limitations rule.” See 
Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope: 
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1979 (2005). 
 8 Rather, this doctrine analyzes whether repair of a patented product is so substantial 
as to constitute an unlicensed reconstruction of that product. See Leesona Corp. v. United 
States, No. 130-70, 1978 WL 14862, at *16 (Ct. Cl. May 1, 1978) (“Under the doctrine of 
repair or reconstruction, a device is reconstructed if it takes on the nature of a new 
infringing device, whereas, if the device is merely repaired, it does not take on the nature 
of a new device.”). 
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invention is patentable.9  The heart of the invention has also been 
debated in the context of damages and the written description 
requirement’s “omitted elements” test and mentioned less 
prominently in the context of enablement.10 
Part I of this Article defines the “heart of the invention” and 
introduces Aro’s commandment: the heart of the invention should 
not be considered in patent law.  It then explains how this rule has 
been inconsistently obeyed.  The doctrines of infringement, 
anticipation, obviousness, and the written description requirement 
follow Aro.  But the doctrines of contributory infringement, 
inequitable conduct, and joint inventorship consider the heart of 
the invention.  Yet no one suggests that these doctrines are 
inconsistent with Aro’s commandment because the different 
doctrines use different terminology.  This Part shows how instead 
of discussing the heart of the invention, each area of the law uses a 
different label to capture the same concept.  Finally, Part I 
compares the current argument in favor of considering the heart of 
the invention to recent thinking about central claiming.  Both 
arguments attempt to focus the law on the actual invention and 
disfavor bright line rules that may detract from that focus. 
Part II of this Article critically analyzes Aro and explains that 
the majority opinion improperly relied on the Supreme Court’s 
earlier Mercoid decisions—decisions that Congress had already 
rejected by enacting the Patent Act of 1952.11  What’s more, this 
Part argues, Aro did not just interpret precedent wrongly; it is also 
bad policy.  Aro’s test has led to results that are at odds with 
commonsense notions of what repair and reconstruction are. 
Part III then outlines an analytical framework for reconciling 
how different doctrines treat the heart of the invention and explains 
when it makes sense to reject the heart of the invention and when it 
does not.  The decision turns on the nature and context of the 
question being asked.  If the doctrine at issue asks whether 
something falls within the boundaries protected by a patent, the 
heart of the invention should not be considered.  Rather, the “all 
 
 9 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); see infra Part III.B. 
 10 See infra Part III.B. 
 11 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra Part II.C. 
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elements” rule should apply.  However, there are many doctrines 
that do not evaluate whether a product or process falls within a 
patent’s boundaries.  In those cases, courts should be free to 
consider the heart of the invention.  Part III goes on to apply this 
framework to several developing areas of patent law where 
scholars are currently examining whether the heart of the invention 
is an appropriate consideration.  They are patentable subject 
matter, the “omitted elements” test, damages, and enablement. 
Part IV discusses the recent Quanta decision on exhaustion.  
Patent exhaustion and contributory infringement share a similar 
question and both appropriately focus on the heart of the invention.  
Part IV then acknowledges that Quanta outlined a two-pronged 
standard that may be difficult to apply.  The author therefore 
recommends that the lower courts focus on the contributory 
infringement prong because it provides an objective test for 
determining when a subset of limitations is “essential.” 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE HEART OF THE INVENTION 
The term “heart of the invention” gained notoriety in the 1961 
Supreme Court case, Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co.12  In this landmark case, the Supreme Court said 
that it was improper to consider the heart of the invention in 
determining whether the defendant’s actions constituted a 
permissible repair or an impermissible infringing reconstruction.13  
The courts have used many different labels to capture the same 
 
 12 365 U.S. 336 (1961).  The Supreme Court issued two decisions involving the same 
parties.  Even though the first decision is often referred to as Aro I, this Article refers to it 
as Aro.  The second decision, Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476 (1964), is notable because it found that to be liable for 
contributory infringement, there must be a showing that an alleged infringer not only 
knew of the patent, but also that the use of the component would infringe the patent.  It 
said nothing about the heart of the invention. 
 13 See infra Part III.A.  Under the doctrine of repair and reconstruction, a patentee 
cannot prevent a purchaser of a patented article from repairing that article. See Aro, 365 
U.S. at 342.  That is part of the bundle of rights that comes with purchasing the patented 
article.  However, when the repair becomes so substantial that it is considered a 
reconstruction, there is a patent infringement. See id. at 346. 
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concept.  For example, the terms “essential features/elements,”14 
the “gist”15 of the invention, “the point of novelty,”16 and “central 
concept”17 have all been used to identify a part of a patent’s claims 
that is crucial to understanding the invention and distinguishing it 
from the prior art.  For simplicity’s sake, this Article uses the 
“heart of the invention” to refer to any subset of claim elements or 
limitations that are more important than the remaining elements or 
limitations for the particular decision under consideration. 
This Article does not wish to overstate the significance of the 
heart of the invention.  For many patents, there is no separable 
“heart of the invention.”18  Consider a Post-it note.  If the patent 
for a Post-it note had only two limitations—a piece of paper and a 
re-adherable strip of adhesive—we could not identify just one of 
those two as the heart of the invention.19  Both limitations are 
absolutely necessary to understand and practice the claimed 
invention.  To focus on one component by itself would clearly not 
do justice to the invention.  The fact that some patents do not 
reveal a distinct heart of the invention shows that patent doctrines 
cannot be solely based on this consideration.  Nonetheless, the 
 
 14 Decisions discussing the written description doctrine (in the context of the “omitted 
elements” test) have used the “essential elements” terminology. See infra notes 199–211 
and accompanying text.  The current debate over damages patent reform also uses this 
label. See infra notes 212–15 and accompanying text.  The Supreme Court has just 
recently used the phrase “essential features” in the context of patent exhaustion. Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2119 (2008); see infra Part IV.B.    
 15 Aro, 365 U.S. at 345. 
 16 Decisions discussing inequitable conduct refer to the point of novelty. See infra 
notes 44–46 and accompanying text.  Similarly, the term “novel aspect of the invention” 
has been used in evaluating enablement. Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 
501 F.3d 1274, 1284–85 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 17 A recent highly publicized decision on subject matter patentability used the phrase 
“central to the purpose of the claimed process.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).  
 18 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2119, 2137 (2008) (stating that “[t]here need not be a singular, defining feature of 
an invention that is key to its patentability”); see also Howard T. Markey, Some Patent 
Problems, 80 F.R.D. 203, 209 (1979) (“[T]here ain’t no new elements! Only God makes 
things out of new elements.”). 
 19 Holbrook, supra note 18, at 2160 (noting that “the creation of Post-It Notes® 
involved the use of two known elements”). 
C03_CHAO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  1:01 PM 
2010] BREAKING ARO’S COMMANDMENT 1191 
“heart of the invention” should play an important role in 
formulating and applying many doctrines.20 
Whether the heart of the invention exists is not just a function 
of the underlying technology.  Often the way attorneys draft the 
patent’s claims determines whether there is a heart of the 
invention.  If the same Post-it note patent has a third limitation—
for example, restricting the paper to be square—we might identify 
the heart of the invention as the first two limitations.  The physical 
dimensions of the paper are of lesser importance and are not part of 
the “heart of the invention.”  This example shows how attorneys 
can graft additional limitations to an invention and thereby elevate 
the importance of the original claim limitations to the point where 
they become the heart of the invention. 
A. Treatment of the Heart 
Having defined the heart of the invention, the next step in the 
analysis is to understand how that concept is treated in patent law.  
The established view is that the issue has been settled for some 
time and the courts are not permitted to consider the heart of the 
invention in their analysis.21  The following statement illustrates 
the prevailing viewpoint: 
the idea of dissecting a component from a patented 
combination and analyzing it violates principles that 
today at least, are well-settled in patent law.  Patent 
law inquiries as to the inventiveness of a claim must 
consider the combination as a whole, rather than 
isolate an individual element, whether or not the 
element is identifiable as the gist or heart of the 
invention.22 
 
 20 See Dan L. Burk  & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1799 n.204 (2009) (acknowledging that for 
many inventions there may be no “point of novelty,” but arguing that “doesn’t mean it 
can’t be helpful [for claim construction] in particular cases”). 
 21 Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the 
Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 454 (1999).  
 22 Id.; see Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1798 (“‘Point of novelty’ as a concept has 
a bad reputation in patent law . . . .” (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 
721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); Holbrook, supra note 18, at 2160 (“The entire 
concept of a particular ‘patentably distinctive’ aspect of an invention harkens back to the 
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However, a closer look at the case law shows that patent law 
often treats the concept of the heart of the invention differently 
depending on what label is used.  Decisions rejecting the concept 
rely on Aro and use the term “heart of the invention.”23  Decisions 
in the area of direct infringement, anticipation, obviousness, the 
written description requirement, and the doctrine of repair and 
reconstruction fall within this category.24 
Thus, to find infringement, it is not sufficient to show that the 
accused device possesses the heart of the patented invention.25  A 
patentee must prove that each limitation of the claimed invention is 
present.26  The same principle applies to the related doctrines of 
anticipation27 and obviousness.28  Under these doctrines, an 
invention is not patentable if it is either anticipated or rendered 
obvious by the prior art.29  To show that the patent is invalid as 
 
rejected concept of the ‘heart’ or ‘gist’ of the invention.” (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961))); F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. 
LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking Contracting Options Off the Table?, 
2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315, 321.  In contrast, the Federal Circuit has only recently 
rejected the concept of considering the “point of novelty” when determining infringement 
for design patents. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 672 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 23 See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 18, at 2160 (quoting Aro, 365 U.S. at 345).  
 24 See infra Part III.A. 
 25 See Janis, supra note 21, at 454.  
 26 In Allen Engineering v. Bartel, 299 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the district 
court relied on the fact that the defendant’s product included the heart of the patented 
invention to find both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents. Id. at 1345 (citing Aro for the proposition that “[i]t is well settled that ‘there 
is no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, gist or ‘heart’ of the invention 
in a combination patent’”).  The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s findings, and 
instructed the district court to construe each disputed limitation and compare each of 
those limitations to the accused device to determine infringement. See id. at 1354–55. 
 27 PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“‘Anticipation’ means lack of novelty; that is, that the invention was already 
known.”).  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) defines “novelty” and says that a person is not entitled 
to a patent if the invention was known in one of several different categories of prior art.   
 28 Another condition of patentability is non-obviousness.  35 U.S.C. § 103 states that 
even if an invention satisfies § 102’s novelty requirement, the invention is not patentable 
if it is obvious in view of the prior art.   
 29 “Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of 
a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 
F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  In contrast, obviousness is a much more flexible test 
that may take into account multiple references and secondary factors. See KSR Int’l Co. 
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anticipated, it is not sufficient to show that the prior art discloses 
the heart of the invention;30 each and every limitation must be 
found in the reference.31  Similarly, the doctrine of obviousness 
requires an examination of “the subject matter as a whole.”32 
The courts also do not consider the heart of the invention when 
determining if a claim satisfies the written description 
requirement.33  Under this requirement, an inventor must show 
possession of the invention at the time the application was filed.34  
Again, the written description requirement cannot be satisfied by 
merely proving that the heart of the invention was described in the 
original specification; rather, the inventor must prove that there 
was a written description supporting every limitation found in the 
 
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 
1, 17–18 (1966). 
 30 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The 
law looks to the particular inquiries set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(g), which focus on 
knowledge, use, sale, disclosure, etc., of the invention.  Notions of ‘concept’, ‘essence’, 
‘key’, ‘gist’, etc., are no more useful in the context of § 102 than elsewhere, because they 
divert the fact-finder’s attention from the subject matter of the invention as a whole.”). 
 31 Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-LA Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“Anticipation under § 102(a) generally requires the presence in the prior art of each and 
every limitation of the claimed invention.”).  
 32 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 
1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that it was error to focus on a single step of a multi-
step process to establish invalidity and that “[i]n determining obviousness, there is ‘no 
legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ [element], ‘gist’, or ‘heart’ of the 
invention.’” (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 
345 (1961))); Para-Ordnance Mfg. v. SGS Importers Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1087  (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen determining obviousness, the claimed invention should be 
considered as a whole; there is no legally recognizable ‘heart’ of the invention.” (citing 
W.L. Gore, 721 F.3d at 1548)).   
 33 The written description requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1:  
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same . . . . 
 34 In practice, the written description requirement prevents an inventor from amending 
an application’s claims during the prosecution to encompass subject matter that was not 
described in the original application. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 
1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“‘Adequate description of the invention guards against the 
inventor’s overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that his 
future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his original creation.’” 
(quoting Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981))). 
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claim.35  Of course, decisions applying the doctrine of repair and 
reconstruction must follow Aro, and those do not consider the heart 
of the invention.36 
On the other hand, there are a number of other doctrines that 
focus on a subset of unpatented limitations without labeling it the 
heart or gist of the invention, and without discussing Aro.  The 
most prominent of these doctrines is contributory infringement, 
which is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).37  Contributory 
infringement assumes that a party did not make, use, or sell the 
entire patented invention.38  Nonetheless, the statute imposes 
liability for a party that contributes to another’s act of direct 
infringement.39 
 
 35 In Vas-Cath, the Federal Circuit found that the district court incorrectly attempted to 
identify the “‘novel or important’” part of the invention to determine whether a 
specification provided a written description for claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 1565 
(quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 745 F. Supp. 517, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1990)).  Again, the 
Federal Circuit relied on Aro for the proposition that “[t]here is ‘no legally recognizable 
or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination 
patent.’” Id. (quoting Aro, 365 U.S. at 345).  The court then compared the written 
description to the claim limitations to determine whether there was a factual issue with 
respect to priority date. See id. at 1565–67. 
 36 See, e.g., Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court “‘has eschewed the suggestion’” of considering 
“‘whether the element of the combination that has been replaced is an ‘essential’ or 
‘distinguishing’ part of the invention’” (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas 
Co., 448 U.S. 176, 217 (1980))). 
 37 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) states in full:  
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports 
into the United States a component of a patented machine, 
manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus 
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of 
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially 
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple 
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 
 38 See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 531 (1953) (“Contributory infringement within its proper 
bounds has always, by its very nature, given protection to something not strictly within 
the claim, and in this sense alone ‘unpatented.’” (emphasis omitted)).  
 39 For contributory infringement to exist, there must be direct infringement by another 
party. See BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“Indirect infringement requires, as a predicate, a finding that some party amongst 
the accused actors has committed the entire act of direct infringement.”). 
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To determine if a party is liable for contributory infringement, 
the statute asks a series of questions.  Is the component a “material 
part of the [patented] invention”?40  Is it “especially made or 
especially adapted for use in an infringement of [the] patent”?41  Is 
the component a “staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial non-infringing use[s]”?42  If the party 
supplies a “material part” of the patented invention (i.e., the heart 
of the invention) and satisfies the other requirements of § 271(c), 
the party can be held liable for contributing to another’s 
infringement.43 
The doctrine of inequitable conduct also considers the heart of 
the invention.  Inequitable conduct occurs when a patentee fails to 
disclose material information to the patent office with deceptive 
intent.44  The issue of materiality is often hotly contested.45  When 
undisclosed prior art corresponds to the “point of novelty,” that 
showing strongly weighs in favor of finding materiality.46  Again, 
the phrase “point of novelty” captures the idea of the “heart of the 
invention” without using that label. 
The determination of joint inventorship is yet another area in 
which patent law considers the heart of the invention.  As a general 
rule, 35 U.S.C. § 116 requires all the inventors of the claimed 
 
 40 17 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.03(4) 
(2005). 
 41 17 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also CHISUM, supra note 40, § 17.03(4). 
 42 17 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also CHISUM, supra note 40, § 17.03(3). 
 43 17 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also CHISUM, supra note 40, § 17.03(4). 
 44 See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365–71 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), for a discussion and analysis of inequitable conduct. 
 45 See, e.g., Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 1000 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
 46 McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 918–19 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (affirming inequitable conduct finding when undisclosed prior art disclosed 
two of the “points of novelty”); Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 1369, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (upholding district court’s finding that misleading declarations that 
went to the “very point of novelty” were material); Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. 
Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding 
materiality where the undisclosed prior art disclosed what the applicant touted as the 
“point of novelty”); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 
1253, 1256–59 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that there was inequitable conduct regarding 
undisclosed prior art that disclosed the “point of novelty”). 
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invention to jointly apply for a patent.47  If all the proper inventors 
are not named, a defendant can argue that a patent is invalid.48  
“[T]o be a joint inventor, an individual must make a contribution to 
the conception of the claimed invention that is not insignificant in 
quality, when that contribution is measured against the dimension 
of the full invention.”49  This requires that a person “do more than 
merely explain to the real inventors well known concepts and/or 
current state of the art.”50  In application, this means that a person 
is only an inventor if the person contributed to a “significant” part 
of the invention that corresponded to the heart of the invention.  If 
the person simply provided elements from the prior art that did not 
require any special insight, the person is not an inventor.51 
Thus, a review of different patent law doctrines shows a 
fundamental inconsistency in the way patent law treats the heart of 
the invention.  On the one hand, many doctrines rely on Aro for a 
fundamental rule: patent law does not recognize the heart of the 
invention.52  Indeed, this rule has been treated with such 
unquestioned reverence that this Article calls the rule Aro’s 
commandment.  Yet, as shown above, many doctrines in patent 
law consistently break this commandment by using different 
labels.  This conflict clearly needs to be resolved.  If Aro’s 
commandment is correct, the rule should be followed in all areas of 
patent law.  If it is not, there needs to be an analytical framework 
for understanding when it is appropriate to consider the heart of the 
invention.  This Article argues that Aro’s commandment is wrong; 
there should be no rule against considering the heart of the 
 
 47 See CHISUM, supra note 40, § 11.02(2). 
 48 See, e.g., BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 338 F.3d 1368, 1373–74 
(Fed. Cir. 2003).  Defendants have relied on 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006) to argue that the 
failure to name the proper inventors renders a patent invalid. See Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 
155 F.3d 1344, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[S]ection 102(f) still makes the naming of the 
correct inventor or inventors a condition of patentability; failure to name them renders a 
patent invalid.”).  It should be noted that 35 U.S.C. § 256 allows inventorship to be 
corrected if there was no deceptive intent. 
 49 Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(f); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 50 Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1351.  
 51 See Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 978–79, 980–81 
(Fed. Cir. 1997); see infra notes 178–83 and accompanying text. 
 52 See supra Part I. 
C03_CHAO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  1:01 PM 
2010] BREAKING ARO’S COMMANDMENT 1197 
invention.  It then proceeds to outline a framework for determining 
when to consider the heart of the invention. 
B. A Rule Outlawing Heart 
Even without a detailed examination of Aro’s impact on patent 
law, there is something intuitively strange about the rule.  This is 
not a situation where a rule incidentally causes the judges to 
overlook a basic principle in favor of bright line rule.  Rather, Aro 
expressly instructs courts and juries to continually ignore the 
fundamental nature of what a patentee invented.53  However, when 
courts pretend that there is no heart of the invention, some results 
will inevitably be incorrect, and in many cases, absurd. 
This issue is representative of a larger class of problems.  
Courts often focus on formalistic rules that ignore the central goals 
of the patent system.  Rules certainly have their benefits.  They 
provide objective guidelines for judges and juries to follow.54  
However, those rules should not be followed blindly at the expense 
of overlooking basic principles. 
Jeanne Fromer, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley address a very 
similar problem in two recent articles.55  Patent law defines “what 
the patentee owns not by what . . . [the patent describes in the 
specification], but by what [it] claims.”56  Thus, patent claims have 
been compared to “the ‘metes and bounds’ of a real property deed, 
defining the outer boundaries of a ‘property’ right conferred on the 
patentee.”57  Fromer, Burk and Lemley argue that this system of 
peripheral claiming frequently overlooks the fundamental nature of 
the invention.58 
 
 53 See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961). 
 54 See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 
(2003) (“Advocates of formally realized rules argue that they reduce judicial discretion, 
lead to more certain outcomes and provide private actors with the certainty necessary to 
order their affairs in an efficient fashion.”). 
 55 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20; Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual 
Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009). 
 56 Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1744. 
 57 Id. (footnotes omitted).  This is called peripheral claiming. Fromer, supra note 55, at 
726. 
 58 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1745–46; Fromer, supra note 55, at 757–58. 
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As a remedy, they propose incorporating central claiming 
features into the current system.59  Under a central claiming 
approach, the patentee describes the central or prototypical 
embodiments with the understanding that the patent will cover a 
broader set of similar embodiments.60  According to Burk and 
Lemley, central claiming “puts the focus on what the patentee 
actually invented rather than on what patent lawyers later (often 
much later) drafted as claims to cover the ground in that 
invention.”61  Similarly, Fromer argues that central claiming or 
claiming by exemplar would serve to provide the public with better 
notice about what the patent covers and make it easier for the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office to determine whether 
an application is patentable.62  Burk and Lemley recognize that a 
complete shift to central claiming may not be realistic.63  Instead, 
they suggest an intermediate proposal of limiting claim 
construction “to terms that are (1) technical and (2) the point of 
novelty.”64 
Fromer, Burk and Lemley made their recommendations 
because the current system of peripheral claiming often leads 
judges and juries unintentionally to ignore the actual invention and 
instead focus on claims drafted by attorneys.65  Since claims are 
 
 59 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1746–47; Fromer, supra note 55, at 772. 
 60 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1746 (“Under a central-claiming approach, 
the patentee does not delineate the outer reach of what it claims.  Rather, the patentee 
discloses the central features of the invention—what distinguishes it from the prior art—
and the courts determine how much protection the patent is entitled to by looking at the 
prior art that cabins the invention, how important the patentee’s invention was, and how 
different the accused device is.” (footnotes omitted)); Fromer, supra note 55, at 727 
(stating that in central claiming, “the rightsholder describes the central, or prototypical, 
set members, but the right tends to cover a broader, similar set of items”). 
 61 Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1787.  
 62 See Fromer, supra note 55, at 775–77. 
 63 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1795. 
 64 Id. at 1798.  Burk and Lemley state that current claim construction disputes often 
have nothing to do with the heart of the invention. See id.  Instead, they state that these 
disputes focus on drafting errors to limit the patent “in ways the inventor did not intend or 
on a deliberate ambiguity to broaden the patent to cover things the patentee did not 
invent.” Id. (footnote omitted).  
 65 Fromer, supra note 55, at 776 (describing how central claiming provides a 
“narrower and more concrete [description] covering the heart of the invention rather than 
every esoteric variation”).  
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only imperfect written proxies for the invention, they should not be 
treated as if they absolutely define it.66 
This Article does not examine central claiming, but tries to 
achieve some of the same goals advanced by its proponents.  
Courts and juries should not be told that they must always give 
equal weight to each limitation of a claim.  Like peripheral 
claiming, this rule diverts attention to the outer bounds of the 
invention, not the heart.  Under the right circumstances, courts 
should reject Aro’s commandment and focus attention on what the 
patentees actually invented.  That is fundamentally what Fromer, 
Burk and Lemley are trying to do, albeit in a different context.  
Indeed, it is very odd that patent law has even arrived at this point.  
It seems self evident that some doctrines in patent law need to 
examine the heart of the invention.  To understand why patent law 
has arrived at this anomalous point, this Article goes back half a 
century to Aro. 
II. THE FOUNDATION, ARO 
A. Rejecting the Heart 
Although there is certainly relevant older precedent,67 modern 
cases cite to Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co. for the proposition that there is no “heart of the 
invention” in combination patents and thus courts should not rely 
on such a construct in making decisions.68  In Aro, the Supreme 
Court rejected the idea that replacing an “essential” or 
“distinguishing” part of a patented combination constitutes an 
impermissible infringing reconstruction.69  Under the doctrine of 
repair and reconstruction, a patentee cannot prevent a purchaser of 
 
 66 Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1794 (“The problem is . . . the pretense that the 
language on which the interpretation is based can or does concretely define the outer 
boundary of the patent holder’s rights.  This is essentially an impossibility because 
patents describe not a physical entity, but a set of legal entitlements.”). 
 67 In Aro, the Justices analyzed the historical roots of the doctrine of repair and 
reconstruction in arriving at their different opinions. See, e.g., Janis, supra note 21, at 
431–43 (discussing the pre-Aro case law on repair and reconstruction). 
 68 See supra Part I.A. 
 69 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961). 
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a patented article from repairing that article.70  That is part of the 
bundle of rights that comes with purchasing the patented article.  
However, when the repair becomes so substantial that it is 
considered a reconstruction, there is a patent infringement.71  In 
Aro, the issue was how to distinguish between a permissible repair 
and an impermissible reconstruction.72 
The plaintiff, Convertible Top Replacement Co., had the rights 
to a patent for automobile convertible tops.73  The patent covered 
the combination of “a flexible top fabric, supporting structures, and 
a mechanism for sealing the fabric against the side of an 
automobile body in order to keep out the rain.”74  As might be 
expected, the fabric has a much shorter life than the other 
components.  The defendant, Aro Manufacturing Co., 
manufactured and sold “replacement fabrics designed to fit the 
models of convertibles equipped with tops embodying the 
combination covered by the patent.”75 
The automobile owners were authorized to use their 
convertible tops by virtue of a license that the automobile 
manufacturer took from the patentee.76  Under the patentee’s 
theory, the automobile owners exceeded the scope of their license 
when they replaced the fabric in the convertible tops.77  
Accordingly, the patentee sued Aro for contributory infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).78  After trial, the jury returned a verdict 
in favor of patentee and Aro appealed.79 
 
 70 See id. at 342–43. 
 71 See id. at 346. 
 72 See id. at 342. 
 73 Convertible Folding Top with Automatic Seal at Rear Quarter, U.S. Patent No. 
2,569,724 (filed Aug. 12, 1949) (issued Oct. 2, 1951). 
 74 Aro, 365 U.S. at 337. 
 75 Id. at 338. 
 76 In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court addressed the liability of the defendant 
for replacement tops that were used in automobiles that were not licensed to the patent. 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476, 478–81 
(1964). 
 77 Aro, 365 U.S. at 337–38; Aro II, 377 U.S. at 483.  
 78 Aro, 365 U.S. at 337–38.  
 79 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 270 F.2d 200, 201 (1st Cir. 
1959), rev’d, 365 U.S. 336 (1961). 
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict.80  
The decision framed the basic question as whether Aro was 
“merely . . . making a permissible replacement of a part which 
expectedly became worn out or defective sooner than other parts of 
the patented combination”81 or whether such replacement 
constituted a “forbidden reconstruction of the combination.”82  The 
court noted that, “[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts, 
pretty much as an individual instance.”83 
The court then found that Aro was impermissibly 
reconstructing the patented combination by examining two 
factors.84  First, the court looked at the nature of the component 
being replaced and concluded that “the fabric portion of the top 
[was] not a minor or relatively inexpensive component of the 
patented combination.”85  Second, the court examined the expected 
life of the same component and concluded that “the life of the 
fabric is not so short, nor is the fabric so cheap, that we can safely 
assume that an owner would rationally believe that in replacing it 
he was making only a minor repair to his top structure.”86  Relying 
on these factors, the court concluded “that the defendants were not 
making permissible repairs to, but were substantially 
reconstructing, the convertible top combination.”87  This decision 
was in turn appealed to the Supreme Court.88 
In an opinion authored by Justice Whittaker, the Supreme 
Court reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeals and found that 
Aro’s actions constituted a permissible repair.89  More importantly, 
the Court specifically rejected analysis that relied on the 
“essential” or “distinguishing” part of the patented combination by 
stating: 
 
 80 Id. at 206. 
 81 Id. at 202. 
 82 Id. at 205. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id.  
 88 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 338 (1961). 
 89 Id. at 346. 
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The basic fallacy . . . is that it requires the ascribing 
to one element of the patented combination the 
status of patented invention in itself.  Yet this Court 
has made it clear in the two Mercoid cases that 
there is no legally recognizable or protected 
“essential” element, “gist” or “heart” of the 
invention in a combination patent.90 
It is this oft quoted passage (in italics) that has become a 
foundation of modern patent law.  Numerous decisions cite to this 
passage when rejecting attempts to focus on only part of a claim.91  
It is as if Aro carved a commandment in stone: thou shall not look 
at the heart of the invention in patent law. 
The Supreme Court went on to discuss what factors could be 
properly considered by defining the difference between repair and 
reconstruction.  With respect to repair, the Court proclaimed: “We 
hold that maintenance of the ‘use of the whole’ of the patented 
combination through replacement of a spent, unpatented element 
does not constitute reconstruction.”92 
With respect to reconstruction, the Court stated, 
“reconstruction of a patented entity, comprised of unpatented 
elements, is limited to such a true reconstruction of the entity as to 
‘in fact make a new article.’”93 
Aro was far from unanimous.  Justice Brennan agreed with the 
result (that there was a repair), but disagreed with the majority’s 
test.94  He argued that the test described “too narrow a standard of 
what constitutes impermissible ‘reconstruction’” and that “there 
are circumstances in which the replacement of a single unpatented 
component of a patented combination short of a second creation of 
the patented entity may constitute ‘reconstruction.’”95  He went on 
 
 90 Id. at 344–45 (emphasis added); see also id. at 344 (“For if anything is settled in the 
patent law, it is that the combination patent covers only the totality of the elements in the 
claim and that no element, separately viewed, is within the grant.”).  
 91 See supra notes 21–36 and accompanying text.  
 92 Aro, 365 U.S. at 346. 
 93 Id. (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 
1945)). 
 94 Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in result). 
 95 Id. 
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to argue that under precedent, “there is no single test to which all 
must yield; rather the determination is to be based upon the 
consideration of a number of factors.”96  Justice Brennan then 
described those factors: 
Appropriately to be considered are the life of the 
part replaced in relation to the useful life of the 
whole combination, the importance of the replaced 
element to the inventive concept, the cost of the 
component relative to the cost of the combination, 
the common sense understanding and intention of 
the patent owner and the buyer of the combination 
as to its perishable components, whether the 
purchased component replaces a worn-out part or is 
brought for some other purpose, and other pertinent 
factors.97 
The second factor, “the importance of the replaced element to 
the inventive concept,” is simply another way of determining its 
connection to the heart of the invention.98 
The dissent, authored by Justice Harlan and joined by Justices 
Frankfurter and Stewart, agreed with Justice Brennan’s multi-
factor approach, but disagreed with his ultimate conclusion.99  
 
 96 Id. at 363. 
 97 Id. at 363–64 (footnotes omitted).  For the purposes of this Article, only one 
footnote in Justice Brennan’s concurrence is important.  Footnote 3 of Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence listed the historical precedent that showed that the heart of the invention was 
considered when determining whether a repair or reconstruction had taken place. See id. 
at 364 n.3 (citing Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909); 
Morrin v. Robert White Eng’g Works, 143 F. 519 (2d Cir. 1905); Davis Elec. Works v. 
Edison Elec. Light Co., 60 F. 276, 279–80 (1st Cir. 1894) (“[I]n certain stages of use the 
essence of a device, though in appearance only a small portion of it, may be lost, and its 
renewal amount to reconstruction.”)). 
 98  See id. at 360 (Black, J., concurring) (“A fundamental error underlying the 
misleading standards suggested by my Brothers HARLAN and BRENNAN is the notion 
that in a case of this kind a court is obliged to search for the alleged ‘heart’ or ‘core’ of 
the combination patent.”). 
 99 Like Justice Brennan, Justice Harlan argued that “there is no single yardstick for 
determining whether particular substitutions of new for original unpatented parts of a 
patented combination amount to permissible repair or forbidden reconstruction.” Id. at 
371 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Harlan’s dissent went on to criticize the Court’s 
reconstruction test. Id. at 376  (“[N]one of the past cases in this Court or in the lower 
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Justice Harlan argued that the lower courts applied the correct 
standards and the Supreme Court should defer to the lower courts’ 
findings.100  Thus, four Justices thought that the heart of the 
invention should be considered as one factor in a multi-factor 
standard. 
Justice Black agreed with the majority decision, yet he wrote a 
separate concurrence particularly critical of Justices Brennan’s and 
Harlan’s opinions.101  The concurrence characterized the multi-
factor approach as a “Pandora’s flock of insignificant 
standards,”102 and went on to suggest that the test had “ambiguous 
evidentiary standards” and would lead to “mischievous results.”103 
Justice Black was particularly critical of examining the “alleged 
‘heart’ or ‘core’ of a combination patent.”104  He reasoned that “[a] 
patented combination is no more than that, a novel relationship 
brought to bear on what presumably are familiar elements already 
in the public domain.  Such familiar elements are not removed 
from the public domain merely because of their use, however 
crucial, in the novel combination.”105 
In the end, six justices found that the defendant had 
permissibly repaired the convertible top.  However, only five 
justices agreed on the standard announced by the majority—a 
standard that rejected the heart of the invention analysis.  Four 
justices, including Justice Brennan, disagreed with the majority’s 
test and favored a multi-factored approach that looked at, inter alia, 
the importance of the replaced element to the inventive concept. 
 
federal courts remotely suggest that ‘reconstruction’ can be found only in a situation 
where the patented combination has been rebuilt de novo from the ground up.”).  
 100 Id. at 379 (“For reasons larger than this particular litigation I cannot agree that it is 
either necessary or appropriate for us to substitute our particular judgment on this 
particular application of correct standards to the facts.”). 
 101 Id. at 346 (Black, J., concurring). 
 102 Id. at 355. 
 103 Id. at 357; see also Janis, supra note 21, at 444 (relying on Wilson v. Simpson, 50 
U.S. 109 (1850), to argue that the “[Aro] Court’s opinion repudiated the multifactor 
approach to repair-reconstruction, asserting inaccurately that such an approach had 
appeared only in lower court opinions” (emphasis added)).  
 104 Aro, 365 U.S. at 361 (Black, J., concurring). 
 105 Id. 
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To this day, the 5–4 Aro decision serves as the basis for the 
proposition that there is no “heart of the invention” in combination 
patents.  Now that the Quanta decision has recently focused on the 
essential elements of an invention in the context of patent 
exhaustion,106 this Article argues that it is time to revisit Aro.  In 
Part II.B and C infra, this Article explains why Aro’s analysis 
suffers from a number of deficiencies.  First and foremost, the 
standard leads to results that are difficult to apply and inconsistent 
with notions of justice.  Second, the Aro decision incorrectly relied 
on principles from the two Mercoid decisions.  In enacting § 
271(c), Congress explicitly rejected the results of these two 
decisions and, implicitly, their principles. 
B. Problems with Aro’s Standard 
The Aro standard suffers from two analytical problems.  First, 
the test is simply unhelpful.  Second, the test leads to results that 
are inconsistent with commonsense notions of what repair and 
reconstruction are.  These problems can be seen by examining the 
two end points found in Aro.  At one end, a reconstruction “is 
limited to such a true reconstruction of the entity as to ‘in fact 
make a new article.’”107 The test is tautological and simply re-
characterizes the term using words that sound just like the original 
term.  Federal Circuit Judge Gajarsa characterized the test as “we 
know a reconstruction when we see it.”108  It sheds no new light on 
what a reconstruction is.109 
 
 106 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113 (2008). 
 107 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961) 
(quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
 108 Arthur J. Gajarsa, Evelyn Mary Aswad & Joseph S. Cianfrani, How Much Fuel to 
Add to the Fire of Genius? Some Questions About the Repair/Reconstruction Distinction 
in Patent Law, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1205, 1222 (1999); see also FMC Corp. v. Up-Right 
Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (declining to state a bright line test where the 
plaintiff complained that the entire standard was too “amorphous” and asked the Federal 
Circuit to “state the standard more clearly in a way that can be understood and applied 
both by patent owners and potential infringers”). 
 109 See Janis, supra note 21, at 446 (stating that this passage “is nothing but a 
restatement of the exhaustion principle unaccompanied by any thoughtful analysis as to 
whether exhaustion is an appropriate organizing principle for repair-reconstruction”).   
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At the other end of the spectrum, Aro says that “replacement of 
a spent unpatented element” is a repair.110  That may help classify 
some simple cases.  However, it does not help resolve the more 
difficult cases that reside in the middle.  If a claim is made of 
components A though H, would someone replacing components A 
through G be found to be repairing the item? What if they replaced 
all the components over time? 
This issue was explored by the Federal Circuit in FMC Corp. v. 
Up-Right Inc.111  The plaintiff argued that “when the replacement 
parts added over time dominate the original parts, reconstruction 
has occurred.”112  The Federal Circuit carefully avoided 
commenting on the correctness of plaintiff’s theory.  However, the 
decision stated that even under this theory, the plaintiff would have 
lost because it “had failed to establish that a majority of the parts 
of the patented combination had been replaced in any particular 
[product].”113  Thus, the Court in FMC did not reject the possibility 
that the replacing of parts may be so extensive as to constitute an 
impermissible reconstruction.114 
However, a subsequent Federal Circuit decision stated that the 
theory was not viable.  In Husky Injection Molding Systems, Ltd. v. 
R & D Tool & Engineering Co.,115 the court said that “[e]ven if the 
owner sequentially replaces all of the worn-out parts of a patented 
combination, this sequential replacement does not constitute 
reconstruction.”116  This conclusion was dicta, but it shows how 
narrowly one Federal Circuit panel interpreted the reconstruction 
standard.  Indeed, this is the kind of narrow interpretation of 
 
 110 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961). 
 111 21 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 112 Id. at 1078. 
 113 Id. (“The district court found this to be the case regardless of whether one counted 
the number of parts in the grape harvester having corresponding elements in the claimed 
combination without assigning to them any relative values, economic or otherwise, or 
whether one attempted to assign such values.”). 
 114 See id. at 1077 (“This case therefore does not present us with the more difficult issue 
of how much repair to a grape harvester made altogether at any single point in time 
would have risen to the level of reconstruction of a ‘spent’ grape harvester.”). 
 115 291 F.3d 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 116 Id. at 786 (citing Surfco Haw. v. Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 1062, 1065 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); FMC, 21 F.3d at 1077).  
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reconstruction that concerned Justices Brennan and Harlan.117  Of 
course, the next question is how close in time can all the parts be 
replaced: a year, a month, a day?  More importantly, why should 
the span of time over which all the parts are replaced distinguish a 
permissible repair from an impermissible reconstruction? 
Other portions of Husky go on to suggest some bizarre 
inconsistencies.  While acknowledging that Aro rejected the heart 
of the invention analysis, the Federal Circuit suggested that “there 
may be some concept of proportionality inherent in the distinction 
between repair and reconstruction.”118  In particular, the court 
suggested that if a patent covered an automobile, “few would argue 
that the retention of the spark plugs and the replacement of the 
remainder of the car at a single stroke was permissible activity akin 
to repair.”119  Thus, while Husky says that replacing all of the parts 
of a patented combination over time is merely a repair, it also 
suggests that if sufficient components are replaced at the same 
time, reconstruction has taken place.  Adding uncertainty to 
confusion, the court gave no guidance on how to determine when 
that reconstruction threshold has been reached. 
The two results of the Husky analysis are not reconcilable.  But 
that is not the Federal Circuit’s fault.  The conflicting results 
simply reflect the inherent tension between Aro’s standard and 
commonsense.  On the one hand, the Supreme Court has held that 
replacement of a spent part of a combination patent, which is not 
separately patented, is not an impermissible reconstruction no 
matter how essential it may be to the patented combination and no 
matter how costly or difficult replacement may be.120  On the other 
hand, the Federal Circuit correctly noted that no one would 
seriously argue that Husky’s automobile example was a mere 
 
 117 See supra text accompanying note 95 (regarding Justice Brennan’s view); see also 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s concept of what constitutes reconstruction as 
“narrow”).  
 118 Husky, 291 F.3d at 786–87; see also Canon, Inc. v. GCC Int’l Ltd., 263 F. App’x 57, 
61 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that the concept of proportionality is pertinent to determining 
whether a refurbishment is considered a repair or a reconstruction; the same is true for the 
case of replaceable parts, but less so). 
 119 Husky, 291 F.3d at 786. 
 120 Aro, 365 U.S. at 346. 
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repair.121  But that example uses the heart of the invention test, 
albeit without calling it such.  Instead of identifying the essential 
elements of the invention and suggesting that replacing those 
elements constitutes reconstruction, the Federal Circuit used the 
automobile example to identify the insignificant part of the 
invention and suggest that if only that part is retained, there is a 
reconstruction.122  Both Husky and FMC demonstrate how difficult 
it is to apply Aro’s standard in a manner that comports with 
commonsense notions of what repair and reconstruction are. 
Those decisions are not alone.  Earlier, Judge Gajarsa asked if 
another Federal Circuit decision, Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co.123 
“implicitly resurrect[ed] the ‘heart of the invention’ test that was 
rejected by Aro [I]?”124  He also noted that yet another decision, 
Lummus Industries, Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp.,125 approved jury 
instructions that “seem[ed] to direct the jury to focus on a ‘heart of 
the invention’ test . . . . contrary to the mandate in Aro [I].”126 
Another example illustrates why considering the heart of the 
invention would help draw a more sensible line between repair and 
reconstruction.  Consider a patent that claims a computer with a 
microprocessor, a memory, and a bus.127  Of course, computers 
with these elements are well known in the prior art.  In this case, 
the microprocessor contains additional limitations that distinguish 
the claimed invention from the prior art.  Specifically, the 
microprocessor ensures that the most current data is retrieved from 
main memory by monitoring data requests and updating main 
memory when stale data is requested.  Common sense would 
suggest that the additional microprocessor limitations are the 
essential features of invention. 
Now assume that the technology is accepted by the market 
place, and that the patent holder licenses the patent to personal 
computer manufacturers.  A refurbishing company comes along 
 
 121 Husky, 291 F.3d at 786. 
 122 Id.  
 123 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 124 See Gajarsa et al., supra note 108, at 1217.  
 125 862 F.2d 267 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 126 See Gajarsa et al., supra note 108, at 1221. 
 127 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113 (2008). 
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and takes personal computers (that are licensed) and replaces the 
old microprocessors with new faster microprocessors that also 
update memory in the manner claimed by the patent.  Since the 
refurbishing company simply replaced a component, an activity 
that Aro specifically labeled a repair,128 the company has not 
infringed the patent.129  Yet the only contribution the patent added 
to the prior art were limitations found in the microprocessor.  This 
is precisely the kind of activity that should be considered an 
infringing reconstruction.  If it were otherwise, a resourceful 
company could take old IBM personal computer frames from the 
scrapheap, place new hardware (motherboards, memory buses, 
etc.) into the frames and automatically receive licenses to the same 
personal computer patents that IBM has licensed.130 
In contrast, assume that the refurbishing company only 
replaces the memory with faster memory that can store more 
information.  In this case, it seems entirely appropriate that the law 
calls this activity a repair and that the patent holder receive 
nothing.  Although memory was a component of the patented 
invention, it certainly was not an essential element of the 
invention.  The critical distinction between these examples is how 
essential the replaced component is to the invention.  Does the 
replaced component go to the heart of the invention or not?  Aro 
forbids this kind of analysis.131 
C. The Shaky Precedent Underlying Aro 
Not only does the standard in Aro lead to unjust results, it is 
also based on shaky precedent.  The Supreme Court explicitly 
relied on the two Mercoid decisions to prove that there is no 
 
 128 See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961). 
 129 See id. 
 130 Take the analysis one step further.  Imagine if the same company were to combine 
old stock parts from various competing computer manufacturers while filling the key 
parts with the latest technology.  Would the computers have patents rights from all these 
competitors?  Surely, this is an absurd result. 
 131 Gajarsa et al., supra note 108, at 1210 (explaining that the Supreme Court “rejected 
the ‘heart of the invention’ test, which analyzes whether the most essential element is 
being replaced”). 
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legally recognizable or protectable heart of the invention.132  
However, the Patent Act of 1952 superseded the results of the 
Mercoid decisions133 and thus implicitly rejected the reasoning that 
Aro used. 
In the Mercoid cases, the patent holder argued that the 
defendant was liable for contributory infringement because it made 
and sold an unpatented component (stoker switches) used in the 
patented invention (a home heating system).134  The defendant 
argued that the patent holders had committed patent misuse by 
attempting to control an unpatented component.135  In analyzing 
the issues, the Supreme Court explained that: 
The fact that an unpatented part of a combination 
patent may distinguish the invention does not draw 
to it the privileges of a patent.  That may be done 
only in the manner provided by law.  However 
worthy it may be, however essential to the patent, 
an unpatented part of a combination patent is no 
more entitled to monopolistic protection than any 
other unpatented device.136 
The Supreme Court held that the patent holder had committed 
patent misuse even though the court of appeals found that there 
was no other use for the unpatented component.137  As a result, the 
patent holder could not pursue a theory of contributory 
infringement.138  Although the Mercoid decisions did not formally 
reject the doctrine of contributory infringement, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that it was limiting the doctrine “substantially.”139 
 
 132 See Aro, 365 U.S. at 344–45; id. at 361 n.13 (Black, J., concurring) (relying on 
Mercoid I).  
 133 See Nard, supra note 6, at 72 n.105. 
 134 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. (Mercoid I), 320 U.S. 661, 662–63 (1944). 
 135 See id. at 666–67. 
 136 Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator (Mercoid II), 320 U.S. 680, 
684 (1944). 
 137 Mercoid I, 320 U.S. at 664. 
 138 Id. at 668. 
 139 Id. at 669; see also Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for 
Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 384 (2006) 
(“The effect of the Mercoid decisions was to render combination patents, which comprise 
nearly all patents, unenforceable whenever it was impractical to bring individual actions 
against infringers who were widely dispersed.”); Rich, supra note 38, at 535 
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The Mercoid decisions caused considerable consternation in 
the patent bar140 and lead to the enactment of 35 U.S.C § 271(c) by 
the Patent Act of 1952, setting forth the elements of contributory 
infringement.141  A party can be liable for providing an unpatented 
component of a combination patent so long as § 271(c)’s 
requirements are satisfied.142  The component must constitute a 
material part of the invention; the alleged infringer must know that 
the component is especially made or adapted for use in an 
infringement; and the component cannot be a staple of commerce 
with substantial non-infringing uses.143  Subsection (d) protects 
parties from charges of patent misuse when they pursue a theory of 
contributory infringement.144  Thus, to the extent the Mercoid 
cases limited the doctrine of contributory infringement, the Patent 
Act of 1952 removed those limits. 
By supplanting the Mercoid decisions, the Patent Act of 1952 
suggests that Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court’s 
decisions and the underlying analysis in those cases—that there is 
no heart of an invention.  At least part of the legislative history of § 
271 provides additional support for that conclusion.  The Senate 
Report accompanying the Patent Act of 1952 stated, “‘[o]ne who 
 
(“[C]ontributory infringement, as a doctrine, was left untouched by the misuse cases.  
But its applicability was rendered progressively more difficult by the things the Supreme 
Court said in the line of misuse cases that happened to come before it.”). 
 140 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 199 (1980) (“The 
Mercoid decisions left in their wake some consternation among patent lawyers and a 
degree of confusion in the lower courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
 141 See id. at 200 (explaining that the Patent Act of 1952 was instituted as corrective 
legislation). 
 142 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 143 See id. § 271(c).  
 144 Id.  Section (d) states:  
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of 
his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue 
from acts which if performed by another without his consent would 
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or 
authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his 
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) 
sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or 
contributory infringement . . . . 
Id. § 271(d).  
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makes a special device constituting the heart of a patented 
machine and supplies it to others with directions (specific or 
implied) to complete the machine is obviously appropriating the 
benefit of the patented invention.’”145  That statement directly 
contradicts the view advanced in the Mercoid cases.146 
Of course the Supreme Court was aware of the Patent Act of 
1952 in Aro.  The defendant was being accused of contributory 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).147  Moreover, Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence indirectly identified the inconsistency 
between the Patent Act of 1952 and Mercoid’s rejection of the 
“heart of invention”: 
It is true that some decisions of this Court in patent 
misuse cases raised doubt as to the continuing 
vitality of this [multi-factor] standard in actions 
such as this one for relief from contributory 
infringement.  But the Congress swept away that 
doubt when it gave the standard statutory sanction 
in 1952.148 
Similarly, Justice Harlan argued that the “opinion of the Court 
seems to reconfirm Mercoid to fuller effectiveness than it had even 
before the 1952 Act by treating it as if the test of whether there was 
contributory infringement at all was to be found in its language.”149  
However, both Justice Whittaker’s majority opinion150 and Justice 
Black’s151 concurrence failed to address this inconsistency.  It 
 
 145 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 366 n.9 (1961) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952)). 
 146 Compare supra text accompanying note 136, with supra text accompanying note 
145. 
 147 Aro, 365 U.S. at 340–41. 
 148 Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring in result) (footnotes omitted). 
 149 Id. at 378 n.6 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 150 The majority opinion mentions that Mercoid II also stood for the proposition that 
there can be no contributory infringement without direct infringement and that the Patent 
Act of 1952 did not change that part of the law. Id. Those statements are undoubtedly 
correct, but say nothing about the “heart of the invention” analysis. 
 151 Justice Black’s concurrence does not reflect an understanding that the Patent Act of 
1952 has any direct relationship to the Mercoid decisions.  In one part of his opinion, he 
argues that discussion of contributory infringement and the Patent Act of 1952 are 
“confusing and beside the point.” Id. at 347 (Black, J., concurring).  In another part, he 
cites to Mercoid I to demonstrate that the Supreme Court has “unequivocally” rejected 
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could be that the Justices did not fully appreciate the issue.  Justice 
Brennan’s argument was not straightforward, and Justice Harlan’s 
discussion was relegated to a footnote.  Moreover, the “heart of the 
invention” analysis was not the primary issue in Aro.  It was 
simply one factor in the multi-factor approach that Justices 
Brennan and Harlan were advocating.152  Alternatively, Aro could 
simply illustrate the Supreme Court’s continued hostility toward 
the doctrine of contributory infringement.153  Regardless of the 
reason, the fact remains that the majority’s reliance on the Mercoid 
precedent is questionable.  Nonetheless, modern cases continue to 
cite to the discussion of the “heart of the invention” in Aro as one 
of the basic tenets of patent law.154 
Instead of relying on the Mercoid decisions and stating that 
there is no legally recognizable or protected “essential” element, 
“gist” or “heart” of the invention in a combination patent, Aro 
should have relied on § 271(c).  If it had, the Supreme Court would 
have understood that Congress had rejected the view in Mercoid 
and recognized that a subset of claim limitations may be 
sufficiently important to result in liability under the theory of 
contributory infringement.  The same should be true for the 
doctrine of repair and reconstruction.  If a party replaces 
component(s) that can properly be considered the heart of a 
patented invention, that fact should weigh in favor of finding an 
impermissible reconstruction.  As Justice Brennan’s multi-factor 
approach suggests, there may be other factors.  However, the heart 
of the invention analysis should certainly be an important one. 
In sum, Aro’s refusal to recognize the “heart of the invention” 
was approved by a narrow 5–4 majority.  That refusal has made the 
test for repair and reconstruction difficult to apply and inconsistent 
 
the notion that the Court should search for the “heart” or “core” of a combination patent. 
Id. at 360–61.  
 152 See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
 153 The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 244 (1961) (“[S]ection 271 
has not abated the Court’s hostility toward the incidental monopolies of unpatented 
elements that combination-patent holders frequently seek.”). 
 154 See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
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with commonsense notions of what those concepts are.155  
Moreover, the decision was based on precedent that had already 
been overruled by the time Aro was decided.  Nonetheless, modern 
decisions continue to rely on Aro for the proposition that there is 
no “heart of the invention” in combination patents and that courts 
should not rely on such a construct in making decisions.  The 
weakness in the Supreme Court’s analysis of both the law and the 
policy suggests that the lower courts should not be so quick to give 
such uncritical reverence to Aro and automatically apply its 
commandment to other patent law doctrines.  Indeed, these flaws 
suggest that Aro was wrongly decided.156 
III. RECONCILING A BROKEN HEART 
Although the preceding section was highly critical of Aro, this 
Article does not recommend a complete reversal of Aro’s 
commandment.  A rule proclaiming the universal importance of the 
heart of the invention would be equally as foolish as the rule 
rejecting that consideration.  As is often the case, the law should 
 
 155 Professor Janis also criticizes how the doctrine of repair and reconstruction has 
evolved.  However, instead of proposing to more accurately align the test with what our 
general notions of what repair and reconstruction are, he argues that the entire framework 
should be reconceptualized.  Rather than considering what he calls “spentness,” Janis 
suggests that the standard of permissible repair should be thought of as an implied license 
based on the reasonable expectations of the parties. Janis, supra note 21, at 520–21.  It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to provide a full critique of this recommendation.  
However, one major concern comes to mind quickly.  The doctrine of repair and 
reconstruction often relates to what third parties can do with a product.  Therefore, if the 
law follows the expectation of the parties to the transaction, third party rights that society 
may wish to exist (e.g., the ability to refurbish an almost new product) may suffer. See 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26–27 (2000) (explaining that standard 
rights (i.e., non-negotiable) in property law exist, in part, because of the difficulty in 
measuring externality costs (e.g., the costs imposed on strangers)).  Thus, Professor 
Janis’s recommendation would probably curtail the ability of consumers  to perform even 
minor repairs because there would be little incentive for a buyer to protect their third 
party rights. 
 156 Commentators of the time both approved of and criticized the Aro decision.  The 
discussion focused on the proper test for repair and reconstruction and how that impacted 
contributory infringement. See Janis, supra note 21, at 443 n.102 (citing to various 
articles that appeared soon after Aro). 
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apply a more nuanced approach.  In some contexts examining the 
heart of the invention is imminently sensible.  In others, it is not. 
By examining the existing case law, this section provides an 
analytical framework for determining when specific patent law 
doctrines should and should not consider the heart of the invention.  
If the doctrine at issue needs to determine whether a product or 
process falls within the boundaries protected by a patent, the heart 
of the invention should not be considered.  Rather, the “all 
elements” rule should apply.157  However, there are many doctrines 
that do not seek to make that determination.  In those cases, the 
particular aims of the doctrine may call for considering the heart of 
the invention. 
This framework is useful for two reasons.  First, it can identify 
when certain existing doctrines have gone wrong.  For example, 
the preceding section argued that the heart of the invention was 
incorrectly rejected in the context of repair and reconstruction.158  
Since the doctrine of repair and reconstruction does not assess 
whether something falls within the boundaries of a patent, the 
proposed framework supports that conclusion.  Second, a sound 
framework can help the courts understand when the heart of the 
invention should be considered in developing areas of patent law.  
Even now, there are several ongoing debates as to whether the 
heart of the invention should be considered.  These debates include 
subject matter patentability, damages, the “omitted elements” test, 
and even enablement.  This section proceeds to apply the analytical 
framework outlined above to those areas and make 
recommendations. 
A. Existing Doctrines 
By examining direct infringement, anticipation, and 
obviousness on the one hand and contributory infringement, 
inequitable conduct, and joint inventorship on the other hand, this 
section explains why it makes sense to reject the heart of the 
invention in some situations while considering that factor in other 
 
 157 See Meurer & Nard, supra note 7, at 1979–80, for a brief historical discussion of the 
all elements rule. 
 158 See supra Part II.B–C. 
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contexts.  For the most part, those decisions that reject considering 
the “heart of the invention,” do so for basically the same reason.  
They are applying or extending the “all elements” rule.  That rule 
“holds that an accused product or process is not infringing unless it 
contains each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an 
equivalent.”159 
The patent law defines “what the patentee owns not by what 
she actually built or disclosed, but by what she claimed.”160  The 
“all elements” rule is a natural consequence of using the claims to 
define the boundaries of a patented invention.  It is entirely 
reasonable to insist that all of the limitations of a claim be present 
when determining whether a particular product, process, or 
embodiment falls within those boundaries or not. 
With that understanding in mind, rejecting the heart of the 
invention in some contexts is necessary because all of a patent’s 
limitations must be considered.  For example, in the context of 
direct infringement, every element of the claimed invention must 
be found in the accused device to show infringement.161  To prove 
that a patent is invalid as anticipated, the prior art reference must 
disclose each and every limitation.162  Similarly, to show that a 
patent is invalid as obvious, all the limitations of a patented 
invention must be considered.163  This is actually a statutory 
requirement.  Section 103 discusses how obviousness must be 
judged by looking at both the prior art and the invention “as a 
whole.”164  Thus, each of these doctrines sensibly examines all of 
 
 159 Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)); see 
also id. (“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the 
scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to 
individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.” (quoting Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 160 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1744.  Much of Fromer, Burk and Lemley’s 
criticisms of peripheral claiming apply directly to the “all elements” rule. 
 161 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
 162 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 163 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 164 Section § 103(a) states:  
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically 
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
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the limitations of a claim and refuses to consider the heart of the 
invention. 
Other doctrines do not need to determine whether a product or 
process falls within the boundaries protected by a patent.  In these 
contexts, it makes sense to focus on a subset of the patent’s claims 
that make up the heart of the invention.  For example, the doctrine 
of contributory infringement sets forth the requirements for 
holding a party liable for contributing to another’s infringement 
when the party does not directly infringe the patent itself.165  In 
other words, contributory infringement only applies to a party that 
is not directly infringing a patent.  Thus, § 271(c) focuses on the 
“material part of an invention.”166  This is the only sensible way to 
impose liability for contributory infringement. 
Indeed, rejecting the heart of the invention in contributory 
infringement would lead to undesirable results.  Such a rejection 
could take one of two basic forms.  First, the law could discard this 
consideration entirely and impose no liability for supplying a part 
of an invention, no matter how important, thereby making the heart 
of the invention analysis unnecessary.  Under this hypothetical 
rule, a manufacturer supplying a microprocessor to a computer 
manufacturer could not be held liable for contributing to the 
infringement of the computer patent requiring a microprocessor 
with specialized algorithms.  In essence, this was the rule from the 
Mercoid decisions, which were overruled by § 271(c).167  This rule 
is consistent with Aro’s commandment, but it would have allowed 
parties an easy way to escape infringement.  They could supply all 
but one very insignificant part of an invention, allowing their 
 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 165 See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
 166 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or 
imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented 
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple 
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be 
liable as a contributory infringer.” (emphasis added)). 
 167 See supra Part II.C. 
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customers to complete the invention.168  Alternatively, the law 
could say that contributory infringement exists whenever a party 
supplies any part of the patented invention.  This rule also does not 
require examining the heart of the invention.  However, it would 
impose liability on those that provide very basic components, or to 
use the language of § 271, staples of commerce.169 
Instead, § 271(c) only imposes liability on those that supply a 
“material part of the invention” knowing that it will be used to 
infringe the patent.170  By considering the heart of the invention, § 
271 narrowly focuses liability on those parties that actually bear 
responsibility for third party infringement.  Since this analysis does 
not evaluate whether something falls within a patent’s boundaries, 
contributory infringement represents an entirely appropriate 
treatment of the heart of the invention. 
Inequitable conduct is another doctrine that does not ask 
whether something—in this case, the prior art—falls within the 
boundaries protected by the patent.  Rather, in assessing whether a 
patentee failed to disclose material prior art during the prosecution 
of its application, inequitable conduct sensibly focuses on the 
“point of novelty.”171  This is just another pseudonym for the heart 
of the invention.  The fact that patent law examines the point of 
novelty when determining materiality is not controversial.  Indeed, 
use of a claim chart analysis (i.e., examining all the elements) 
would restrict the doctrine to those few cases in which a complete 
anticipation was suppressed and lead to absurd results.  Consider 
one of the patents involved in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.172  
U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 (the “’970 patent”) relates to a hybrid 
 
 168 Although a patent holder technically can sue the end customers, it is far easier to sue 
one supplier than multiple end users.  In fact, the Supreme Court recognized this principle 
in a copyright infringement case. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005) (recognizing that for practical reasons a plaintiff may 
need to sue distributors of the “copying device” instead of the direct infringers who 
downloaded pirated music).   
 169 In other words, would those parties that sell monitors be liable for the infringement 
of every computer patent that happened to recite a monitor? 
 170 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
 171 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.  
 172 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  The issue of inequitable conduct was not at issue in 
this case.  This decision was merely selected to provide an example of an actual patent. 
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electric vehicle.173  In traditional vehicles, an internal combustion 
engine transfers power to the wheels.174  One of the technical 
issues in a hybrid vehicle is how to control the relative 
contributions of both the internal combustion engine and the 
electric motor.175 
The ’970 patent disclosed a “controllable torque transfer unit” 
that accepts torque from both sources.176  However, the claims 
include other elements such as a battery that supplies and stores 
electric energy.177  Of course, suitable batteries are well known in 
the prior art and the Patent Office would not expect the patentee to 
disclose all prior art related to rechargeable batteries.  However, 
the patentee probably was under a duty to disclose any prior art 
that described controllable torque transfer units that accepted 
energy from two different sources.  Again, the critical distinction 
between these two examples is whether the undisclosed prior art 
goes to the heart of the invention, and in this case, undisclosed 
prior art relating to the controllable torque transfer units does go to 
the heart of the invention.  This example shows why inequitable 
conduct does and should consider the heart of the invention. 
Finally, the doctrine of joint inventorship does not attempt to 
evaluate whether a product or process falls within the boundaries 
outlined by a patent, and therefore, it also makes sense for this 
doctrine to consider the “heart of the invention.”  Hess v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.178 illustrates this point.  In Hess, an 
engineer brought an action against a patentee seeking to be named 
as a co-inventor of a patent covering a balloon angioplasty 
catheter.179  The named inventors were doctors and “[t]hey 
explained to the [plaintiff] what they were trying to do, and what 
difficulties they encountered.”180  The plaintiff was an engineer 
unfamiliar with angioplasty catheterization.181  He “recommended 
 
 173 See id. at 1296. 
 174 See id. 
 175 See id.  
 176 Id. 
 177 See id. at 1298. 
 178 106 F.3d 976 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 179 Id. at 977. 
 180 Id. at 980. 
 181 Id.   
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a . . . product that he believed would be suitable for making a 
balloon, showed [the inventors] how a balloon could be formed by 
heating both ends of the tube . . . , and made other suggestions for 
making the catheter, using [specific] tubing.”182  Despite the 
engineer’s contributions, the Federal Circuit said that the lower 
court had “justifiably concluded . . .  that it was [the doctors], and 
not [the plaintiff], who actually conceived and made the patented 
invention and that [the plaintiff’s] contributions to the inventions 
did not constitute the conception necessary to establish co-
inventorship.”183  The engineer was not an inventor because his 
contributions were not related to the heart of the invention. 
In sum, an examination of different patent law doctrines 
reveals that there are sound reasons to both consider and reject an 
inquiry as to the “heart of the invention.”  If the doctrine at issue 
needs to determine whether a product or process falls within the 
boundaries protected by a patent, the “heart of the invention” 
should not be considered.  Rather, the “all elements” rule should 
apply.  However, there are many doctrines that do not entail that 
inquiry.  In those cases, the particular aims of the doctrine may call 
for considering the “heart of the invention.” 
B. Developing Doctrines 
The analytical framework discussed above can provide some 
insights into several of the ongoing debates in patent law.  Subject 
matter patentability, damages determinations, the written 
description requirement, and enablement have all recently 
discussed whether the “central concept,” “essential elements,” or 
“novel aspect” of the invention should play an important role in 
their respective doctrines. 
In 2008, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of patentable 
subject matter in In re Bilski.184  The applicants sought a patent on 
a method of hedging risk in trading commodities and commodity 
options.185  The claims were not specifically tied to any computer 
 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 980–81. 
 184 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218 (2010).  
 185 Id. at 949. 
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or other device and did not result in a tangible product.186  The 
Federal Circuit found that the claims of the application did not 
cover patentable subject matter.187  In arriving at this decision, the 
opinion set out a new test requiring a claimed “process” under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 to be either: (1) tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus, or (2) transform a particular article into a different state 
or thing.188  More recently, the Supreme Court found that while the 
so called “machine-or-transformation” test is “a useful and 
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some 
claimed inventions are processes under § 101 . . . [it] is not the sole 
test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 
‘process.’”189 
Regardless of the primacy of the machine-or-transformation 
test, it is a test that considers the heart of the invention.  In the 
Federal Circuit decision, Judge Michel’s plurality opinion did not 
refer to the heart of the invention, but used other language that 
describes the same concept.  First, the Bilski decision stated that 
“even if a claim recites a specific machine or particular 
transformation of a specific article, the recited machine or 
transformation must not constitute mere ‘insignificant postsolution 
activity.’”190  Thus, adding a data-gathering step to an algorithm 
 
 186 See id.  Claim 1 said:  
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity 
sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps 
of: (a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity 
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers 
purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical 
averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said 
consumer; (b) identifying market participants for said commodity 
having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and (c) initiating a 
series of transactions between said commodity provider and said 
market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of 
market participant transactions balances the risk position of said 
series of consumer transactions.  
Id.  
 187 Id. at 966. 
 188 Id. at 961; see also id. at 960 (reaffirming “that the machine-or-transformation test 
outlined by the Supreme Court is the proper test to apply”). 
 189 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).  
 190 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957.   
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does not make the algorithm patentable.191  Second, the decision 
said that the “transformation must be central to the purpose of the 
claimed process.”192  The terms “insignificant postsolution 
activity” and “central to the purpose” both require identifying the 
heart of the invention.  Thus, under Bilski, the limitations which 
form the heart of the invention must be identified, and then the 
machine/transformation test is applied to those specific limitations. 
The relationship between the language used by Judge Michel 
and Aro did not go unnoticed.  Judge Newman’s dissent 
complained that the concepts mentioned above “raise new conflicts 
with precedent.”193  The dissent went on to recite Aro’s 
commandment and list a number of cases that followed Aro.194  
Judge Newman was concerned that it was too difficult to identify 
process components for the “centrality” and “significance” of their 
“extra-solution activity.”195 Thus, Judge Newman argued that the 
test announced by Bilski would not provide a reliable standard.  In 
reviewing the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court had 
the opportunity to comment on the impact that Aro might have on 
the machine-or-transformation test.  It did not do so.  This silence 
can be interpreted in two ways.  The most likely explanation is that 
the Court simply overlooked how the machine-or-transformation 
may be inconsistent with Aro.196  Alternatively, by characterizing 
 
 191 See id. at 963 (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 
688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
 192 Id. at 962. 
 193 Id. at 994 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 194 Id. (“This court and the Supreme Court have stated that ‘there is no legally 
recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a 
combination patent.’  This rule applies with equal force to process patents, and is in 
accord with the rule that the invention must be considered as a whole, rather than 
‘dissected,’ in assessing its patent eligibility under Section 101.” (internal citations 
omitted) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. 
Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. 
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). 
 195 Id. (“It is difficult to predict an adjudicator’s view of the ‘invention as a whole,’ now 
that patent examiners and judges are instructed to weigh the different process components 
for their ‘centrality’ and the ‘significance’ of their ‘extra-solution activity’ in a Section 
101 inquiry.”). 
 196 A review of Bilski v. Kappos shows that Aro is never mentioned by any of the 
opinions. 
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the test as a useful tool,197 the Supreme Court may have implicitly 
found that Aro did not invalidate its use.  In either case, the 
machine-or-transformation is clearly part of patent law despite the 
fact that it considers the heart of the invention. 
The framework set forth in this Article suggests that the current 
state of affairs is acceptable.  The issue of patentable subject matter 
does not try to assess whether some process falls within a patent’s 
boundaries.  Rather, it asks whether the subject matter of the claim 
is of the type that can be patented.  Therefore, Judge Newman’s 
reliance on Aro and its progeny is misplaced.  There is no reason to 
reject the “heart of the invention” and apply the “all elements” 
rule.  Indeed, focusing on the “heart of the invention” when 
determining patentability is quite rational.  To blindly assume that 
all the limitations are equal would allow clever applicants to add 
superfluous limitations to render an otherwise unpatentable idea 
patentable.  For example, having a computer print data limitation 
does not mean that an invention suddenly passes the machine-or-
transformation test when the printing step has nothing to do with 
the central concept of the invention.  Thus, this Article 
recommends that the courts decline to rely on Aro as the law of 
patentable subject matter develops.198 
There is also currently a question of whether a claim can omit 
an essential element of the invention and still satisfy the written 
description requirement.199  In Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline 
Corp.,200 the Federal Circuit found that amended claims omitting 
an element essential to the invention were invalid for failing to 
satisfy the written description requirement.201  Commentators have 
 
 197 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).  
 198 Of course, this should not be interpreted as an endorsement of Bilski’s 
machine/transformation test.  That is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 199 This issue should not be confused with the question of whether the written 
description provides adequate support for the claims. See supra notes 33–35 and 
accompanying text.  That issue was whether the specification included sufficient 
disclosure of the claimed invention.  Here, the issue is whether the claims omit essential 
elements of the invention. 
 200 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 201 Id. at 1474; see also Matthew L. Goska, Of Omitted Elements and Overreaching 
Inventions: The Principle of Gentry Gallery Should Not Be Discarded, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 
471, 477 (2001) (“The Federal Circuit reversed because it was clear to the court that the 
inventor considered the location of the recliner controls on the console to be an essential 
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called this the “omitted element” or “essential element” test.202  
Soon thereafter, the Federal Circuit stated that Gentry Gallery did 
not create an “essential element” test.203  Instead, the Federal 
Circuit characterized Gentry Gallery as merely holding that 
“claims in an application which are broader than the applicant’s 
disclosure are not allowable.”204  However, more recently in ICU 
Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.,205 the Federal Circuit 
appeared to apply the “essential element” test (without using that 
label or referring to Gentry Gallery).  The technology at issue 
involved medical valves used in the transmission of fluids to or 
from a medical patient.206  The specification described a spike that 
was used to pierce a seal inside the valve.207  The defendant 
successfully argued that the “spikeless” claims were invalid for 
lack of a written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112 because the 
specification limited the invention to valves with a spike.208  The 
Federal Circuit agreed, stating that “based on the disclosure a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the 
inventor . . . to have invented a spikeless medical valve.”209  In 
other words, the spikes were an essential part of the invention.  
 
element of the invention.  Therefore, by amending the claims during prosecution to 
eliminate this essential element, the patent applicant improperly broadened the claims 
beyond the original supporting disclosure.  In other words, there was no written 
description in the specification that taught or suggested moving the controls to places 
other than the console.  The broadened claims were thus held invalid for lack of written 
description.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 202 See Goska, supra note 201, at 473; The Essential Element Test and ICU Medical, 
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 18, 2009, 12:18 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/the-
omitted-element-test-and-icu-medical.html [hereinafter The Essential Element Test]. 
 203 Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (“[W]e did not announce a new ‘essential element’ test mandating an inquiry 
into what an inventor considers to be essential to his invention and requiring that the 
claims incorporate those elements.”). 
 204 Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., 
concurring) (quoting Application of Sus, 134 U.S.P.Q. 301, 310 (C.C.P.A. 1962)); see 
also Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the court’s determination in Gentry Gallery was “premised on clear 
statements in the written description that described the location of a claim element”). 
 205 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 206 Id. at 1372. 
 207 Id. at 1374–75. 
 208 Id. at 1377. 
 209 Id. at 1378. 
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Thus, Dennis Crouch has questioned whether ICU Medical revives 
the “essential elements” test.210 
Despite the “essential element” test’s possible resurgence, 
Matthew Goska suggested that one reason this test may not survive 
is because it “contradicts prior case law [Aro] rejecting the idea of 
a ‘gist’ of the invention.”211  Since the issue does not hinge upon 
whether a particular item falls within the boundaries of a patented 
invention, Aro should not stand in the way of the “essential 
element” test.  This does not mean that the analysis found in this 
Article endorses the “essential elements” test here.  It simply 
means that the previous conventional wisdom about the heart of 
the invention should not muddle our thinking on this topic. 
Similarly, in the context of patent reform,212 one of the hotly 
contested issues is damages,213 and one of the suggested reforms is 
focusing on the essential elements of the invention to determine 
patent damages.214  The proponents of this reform argue that 
damages calculations should be based on the contribution that the 
patented invention provides over the prior art.215  Since the issue 
has nothing to do with whether a particular item falls within the 
boundaries of a patented invention, this Article suggests that 
opponents of this proposal who would mechanically rely on Aro 
 
 210 See The Essential Element Test, supra note 202 (comparing the analysis in ICU 
Medical and Gentry Gallery). 
 211 Goska, supra note 201, at 497–98; see also id. at 500 (“The Supreme Court 
previously held: ‘There is no legally recognizable or protected essential element, gist, or 
heart of the invention in a combination patent.’” (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible 
Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961))). 
 212 In 2009, there was proposed legislation regarding patent reform in both the House 
and Senate. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent 
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009).  A similar bill was introduced in the 
Senate in 2010. See Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 8, 
2010, 2:50 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reform-act-of-2010-an-
overview.html. 
 213 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 3, 2009, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/patent-reform-act-of-2009.html [hereinafter 
Patent Reform Act of 2009].  
 214 IBM, TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT MARKET FOR INNOVATION 4–5 (2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/feb11/docs/munderweiser.pdf 
(suggesting that looking at the “essential elements” of a patent “will focus the damages 
determination on the value of what the inventor actually invented”).  
 215 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, supra note 213.  
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are avoiding the real issues.  Again, this is not an endorsement of 
the “essential elements” proposal.  It simply means that the debate 
should focus on other more important issues and not be stopped by 
a reflexive invocation of dogma. 
Finally, in the context of enablement, the Federal Circuit has 
recently relied on the “novel aspect of [the] invention” to show 
lack of enablement.216  Patents are required to “enable” a person of 
ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed invention.217  Even 
though a patentee is generally allowed to rely on the knowledge of 
a person of ordinary skill in the art, in Automotive Technologies 
International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc.,218 the court said 
that a “novel aspect of an invention must be enabled by the 
patent.”219  Since enablement has nothing to do with whether a 
particular item falls within the boundaries of a patented invention, 
this Article suggests that the “all elements” rule does not apply and 
considering the heart of the invention is permissible.220 
In sum, Part III has demonstrated four points.  First, it explains 
how the “all elements” rule differs from the heart of the invention.  
Second, it uses infringement, anticipation, obviousness, and 
written description analyses to show that applying the “all 
elements” rule makes sense in certain contexts.  Third, it uses 
contributory infringement, inequitable conduct, and joint 
inventorship analyses to demonstrate that considering the heart of 
the invention makes sense in other contexts.  Finally, this Article 
explains that determining whether to apply one doctrine or the 
 
 216 See Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 217 The statutory basis of the enablement requirement is found in § 112, which states 
that the specification shall describe “the manner and process of making and using [the 
invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
[invention].” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 218 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 219 Id. at 1283.  
 220 However, there may be other reasons against considering the heart of the invention.  
In the case of enablement, the author has previously criticized the Automotive 
Technologies decision for its reliance on the heart of the invention based on particular 
goals of the enablement doctrine. See Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the 
Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 64–68, 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/chao-rethinking-enablement.pdf. 
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other depends on the nature and context of the question being 
asked.  If the question is whether something falls within the 
boundaries protected by a patent, the “all elements” rule should 
apply.  However, they are many doctrines that ask different 
questions.  In those cases, courts should be free to consider the 
heart of the invention as appropriate.  Two other important 
examples are the doctrine of repair and reconstruction discussed in 
Part I, and the doctrine of patent exhaustion discussed in Part IV. 
IV. RESUSCITATING THE HEART OF THE INVENTION 
Patent exhaustion limits the patent rights that survive the initial 
authorized sale of a patented item.221  The question that arose in 
Quanta was whether exhaustion should only apply to the sale of 
the entire patented invention or should also apply to the sale of 
components that had to be combined with other components in 
order to practice the patented methods.222  In other words, should 
exhaustion apply to the sale of components that correspond to the 
heart of the invention. 
A. The Facts of Quanta 
The plaintiff, LG Electronics, Inc. (“LGE”) had purchased 
three patents.223  The three patents claimed specific technology for 
managing different components found in a computer.224  LGE sued 
Quanta Computer, Inc. (“Quanta”) for infringing the three LGE 
 
 221 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115 (2008) (“The 
longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a 
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”). 
 222 Id. at 2113.  
 223 Id.  LGE’s three patents were U.S. Patent No. 4,939,641 (“the ’641 patent”), U.S. 
Patent No. 5,379,379 (“the ’379 patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 5,077,733 (“the ’733 
patent”). Id. 
 224 See id.  The ’641 patent “discloses a system for ensuring that the most current data 
are retrieved from main memory by monitoring data requests and updating main memory 
from the cache when stale data are requested.” Id.  The ’379 patent discloses an efficient 
method of organizing read and write requests while maintaining accuracy by allowing the 
computer to execute only read requests until it needs data for which there is an 
outstanding write request. See id.  “The ’733 patent addresses the problem of managing 
the data traffic on a bus connecting two computer components, so that no one device 
monopolizes the bus.” See id. at 2113–14.  
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patents.225  Quanta was a group of companies that “manufactured 
computers using Intel parts in combination with non-Intel memory 
and buses in ways that practice the LGE patents.”226 
In response to LGE’s complaint, Quanta raised the defense of 
patent exhaustion.227  Quanta pointed to a license that LGE had 
already granted Intel.228  The license permitted Intel to 
manufacture and sell microprocessors and chipsets that use the 
LGE patents.229  However, the license stated that 
no license “is granted by either party hereto . . . to 
any third party for the combination by a third party 
of Licensed Products of either party with items, 
components, or the like acquired . . . from sources 
other than a party hereto, or for the use, import, 
offer for sale or sale of such combination.”230 
In two separate decisions, the district court granted summary 
judgment to Quanta, finding that exhaustion applied to some but 
not all of the patents’ claims.231  The district court reasoned that 
“although the Intel products do not fully practice any of the patents 
at issue, they have no reasonable non-infringing use and therefore 
their authorized sale exhausted [LGE’s] patent rights.”232  
However, the court found that exhaustion only applied “to 
apparatus or composition-of-matter claims that describe a physical 
object,” not to process or method claims that describe how to make 
or use a product.233  As a practical matter, this was a victory for 
LGE because a patent is infringed so long as any of its claims are 
infringed. 
 
 225 Id. at 2114. 
 226 Id.  
 227 Id. at 2114–15. 
 228 Id.  
 229 Id. at 2114. 
 230 Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 8, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (No. 06-937)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 231 See id. at 2114–15. 
 232 Id. at 2115 (citing LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1589, 
1598–1600 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).  
 233 Id. (citing LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 
(N.D. Cal. 2003)). 
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The case was appealed.  The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed with the district court and found that exhaustion did not 
apply to method claims.234  However, the Federal Circuit disagreed 
with the district court’s application of exhaustion.  The Federal 
Circuit held that exhaustion did not apply because the court did not 
interpret the license to grant Intel the right to sell its products “to 
Quanta for use in combination with non-Intel products.”235  The 
Federal Circuit reasoned that since there was no authorized sale, 
exhaustion could not apply.236  Quanta appealed this decision to 
the Supreme Court.237 
B. The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit and found that all of 
LGE’s patent rights had been exhausted by LGE’s license to 
Intel.238  After describing the historical roots of patent 
exhaustion,239 the Supreme Court’s analysis was laid out in three 
sections.  First, based on both precedent and policy, the Supreme 
Court held that exhaustion applied to method claims.240  Second, 
the Supreme Court determined that Intel’s components 
substantially embodied the LGE patents to trigger exhaustion.241  
 
 234 Id. (citing LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)). 
 235 Id. (citing LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370).  
 236 LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370.  
 237 Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2115.  
 238 See id. at 2122. 
 239 See id. at 2115–17. 
 240 See id. at 2117–18.  The Court reasoned that “[e]liminating exhaustion for method 
patents would seriously undermine the exhaustion doctrine.  Patentees seeking to avoid 
patent exhaustion could simply draft their patent claims to describe a method rather than 
an apparatus.” Id. at 2117.  “By characterizing their claims as method instead of 
apparatus claims, or including a method claim for the machine’s patented method of 
performing its task, a patent drafter could shield practically any patented item from 
exhaustion.” Id. at 2118.  
 241 See id. at 2118–21.  The Court held that  
the Intel Products constitute a material part of the patented invention 
and all but completely practice the patent.  Here . . . the incomplete 
article substantially embodies the patent because the only step 
necessary to practice the patent is the application of common 
processes or the addition of standard parts.  Everything inventive 
about each patent is embodied in the Intel Products.  
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Finally, the Court analyzed the license to Intel and determined that 
there was an authorized sale to Quanta of licensed Intel 
components that triggered exhaustion.242 
This Article is only concerned with the second section because 
it assesses whether patent exhaustion can be triggered by the sale 
of an item that does not satisfy all the limitations of the claimed 
invention.243  In resolving the issue, Quanta drew heavily on the 
last Supreme Court decision that addressed exhaustion, United 
States v. Univis Lens Co.244 
In the Univis case, Univis Corporation (the “Corporation”) 
owned patents on a particular type of eyeglass lens.245  It licensed a 
related company, the Univis Lens Company, to manufacture and 
sell lens blanks.246  In addition, the Corporation issued three other 
types of licenses.247  The license to wholesalers authorized the 
licensees to purchase the blanks, and finish them by grinding and 
polishing.248  The license to finishing retailers allowed the 
licensees to purchase blanks, finish them, and sell them to their 
customers at prices set by the Corporation.249  The license to 
prescription retailers granted them a license to buy and resell 
finished lenses at a fixed price.250 
The United States sued Univis for violations of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act alleging unlawful restraints on trade.251  In response, 
Univis asserted its patent monopoly rights as a defense to the 
antitrust suit.252  Even though the Univis patents were only 
 
Id. at 2120.  
 242 Id. at 2121–22.  “Because Intel was authorized to sell its products to Quanta, the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion prevents LGE from further asserting its patent rights with 
respect to the patents substantially embodied by those products.” Id. at 2122.  
 243 See id. at 2118–21.   
 244 316 U.S. 241 (1942); see also Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2118–20 (discussing the Univis 
case).    
 245 Univis, 316 U.S. at 243.  
 246 Id.  
 247 Id. at 244.  The three licenses are to wholesalers, finishing retailers, and prescription 
retailers. Id.  
 248 Id.  
 249 See id.  
 250 See id. at 245.  
 251 Id. at 242–43.  
 252 See id. at 243.  
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practiced in part by the wholesalers and finishing retailers who 
ground the blanks into lenses, the Supreme Court found that the 
sale of the lens blanks exhausted the patent on the finished lens 
because the lens blanks “embod[y] essential features” of the 
patented invention and were destined to be “finished” in 
“conformity to the patent.”253  As a result, the Supreme Court 
affirmed an injunction suppressing the license contracts and 
licensing system.254 
In Quanta, the Supreme Court considered “the extent to which 
a product must embody a patent in order to trigger exhaustion.”255  
The Court noted that in Univis, patent rights had been exhausted by 
the sale of an incomplete article.256  By “incomplete,” the Supreme 
Court meant that the article satisfied some (but not all) of the 
limitations of the patented invention.257  Thus, the Court 
interpreted Univis to mean that the sale of an article that contained 
a subset of the patent’s claims limitations could trigger patent 
exhaustion. 
The only question was how to determine when an “incomplete 
article” sufficiently embodied a patent to trigger exhaustion.  The 
Quanta decision relied on two factors.  First, the Supreme Court 
said that “Univis held that ‘the authorized sale of an article which 
is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment 
 
 253 Id. at 250–51.  The Court held that  
[w]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it 
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the 
protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be finished by 
the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so 
far as it is or may be embodied in that particular article.  The reward 
he was demanded and received is for the article and the invention 
which it embodies and which his vendee is to practice upon it.  He 
has thus parted with his right to assert the patent monopoly with 
respect to it and is no longer free to control the price at which it may 
be sold either in its unfinished or finished form. 
Id.  
 254 Id. at 254. 
 255 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2118 (2008).  
 256 See id. at 2119 (“The lens blanks in Univis . . . were ‘without utility until [they were] 
ground and polished as the finished lens of the patent.’” (alteration in original) (citing 
Univis, 316 U.S. at 249)).  
 257 See id. at 2120. 
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of the patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.’”258  
Second, the Court pointed out that the “lens blank in Univis 
embodie[d] essential features of [the] patented invention.”259  The 
Supreme Court explained how the Intel components satisfied both 
these criteria260 and concluded that they embodied the patents.261 
Determining whether an incomplete article “embodies” a 
patent is yet another way of asking if the article goes to the heart of 
the invention.  Thus, under Quanta, considering the heart of the 
invention is critical to the doctrine of patent exhaustion.  This 
result is entirely consistent with the framework discussed in Part 
III of this Article. 
The doctrine of exhaustion does not ask if some item falls 
within the boundaries defined by a patent.  As a result, it should 
not apply the “all elements” rule.  Rather, patent exhaustion can be 
thought of in the same vein as contributory infringement.  For 
contributory infringement, the question is whether someone can 
avoid being charged with infringement by omitting a minor 
limitation when selling a product.  To prevent this tactic, § 271(c) 
must apply the doctrine of contributory infringement to parties that 
sell the heart of the invention.  Similarly for exhaustion, the 
question is whether companies can avoid the impact of the 
exhaustion doctrine by omitting a minor limitation when selling 
the product.262  To avoid this tactic, the Quanta Court properly 
found that exhaustion applied to the sale of products that comprise 
the essential features (i.e., the heart) of the invention.263 
 
 258 Id. at 2119 (citing Univis, 316 U.S. at 249). 
 259 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Univis, 316 U.S. at 250–51).  
 260 See id. at 2120–21 (noting that “[l]ike the Univis lens blanks, the Intel Products 
constitute a material part of the patented invention and all but completely practice the 
patent” and “[e]verything inventive about each patent is embodied in the Intel Products”).  
 261 Id. at 2121. 
 262 See id. at 2118 (“Quanta . .  argues that exhaustion doctrine will be a dead letter 
unless it is triggered by the sale of components that essentially, even if not completely, 
embody an invention.”). 
 263 See id. at 2122 (“The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a 
patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking 
patent law to control postsale use of the article.”).  
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C. Aro v. Quanta 
Quanta’s decision to look at the “essential features” of an 
invention in the context of patent exhaustion seems to be 
inconsistent with Aro.  However, the Supreme Court chose not to 
address this tension directly.  As might be expected, LGE relied on 
Aro to argue that exhaustion should not apply to the sale of 
products that form only part of a patented invention.264  LGE 
argued that 
Univis does not apply because the Intel Products are 
analogous to individual elements of a combination 
patent, and allowing sale of those components to 
exhaust the patent would impermissibly “ascrib[e] 
to one element of the patented combination the 
status of the patented invention in itself.”265 
The Supreme Court rejected that argument on two grounds.  
First, the Court said that Aro was only concerned with whether the 
replacement of a part of a patented combination constituted 
infringement.266  Since the “replacement question” was not at issue 
in Quanta, the Court implied (but did not say) that Aro was not 
applicable.267  Second, the Supreme Court said that “Aro’s warning 
that no element can be viewed as central to or equivalent to the 
invention is specific to the context in which the combination itself 
is the only inventive aspect of the patent.”268  However, this 
passage shows that the Court does not fully appreciate the 
significance of Aro.  Aro was not simply recognizing that some 
patents may not have an identifiable heart, like the Post-it note 
discussed earlier.  Aro said that the unpatented part of a 
combination patent was not entitled to any protection regardless of 
 
 264 See id. at 2118–19. 
 265 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344–45 (1961)).  
 266 Id. at 2121.  
 267 Id.  
 268 Id.  The Supreme Court characterized this argument as “more important.” Id. 
(“[M]ore importantly, Aro is not squarely applicable to the exhaustion of patents like the 
LGE Patents that do not disclose a new combination of existing parts.  Aro described 
combination patents as ‘cover[ing] only the totality of the elements in the claim [so] that 
no element, separately viewed, is within the grant.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Aro, 
365 U.S. at 344)). 
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how “worthy” or “essential” the part was to the invention269—that 
is, even if one part did contain the inventive aspect of the patent. 
By relying on these distinctions, the Supreme Court did not 
have to discuss what role the heart of the invention should play in 
patent law generally.  Nor did it mention the numerous cases that 
dogmatically repeat Aro’s commandment.  Nonetheless, Quanta 
can arguably be interpreted to limit Aro to the “replacement 
question” and thus strike at the foundation of those cases that rely 
on Aro outside the doctrine of repair and reconstruction.  After 
Quanta, the heart of the invention is considered in the context of 
exhaustion.  At the same time, Aro prevents it from being 
considered under the doctrine of repair and reconstruction.  But 
now, Aro’s commandment does not preside over all of patent law.  
Although Quanta did not overrule those cases that relied on Aro in 
other doctrines, by limiting Aro, the Supreme Court wiped the slate 
clean.  The Federal Circuit is now free to explicitly acknowledge 
that patent law recognizes the heart of the invention and look to 
that factor in the appropriate contexts.  Part III of this Article 
explained how that choice should be made. 
Of course this is not a totally satisfactory situation.  The 
Supreme Court should eventually resolve the tension between Aro 
and Quanta.  Why does the heart of the invention play an 
important role in patent exhaustion, when it is not even “legally 
recognize[ed]”270 for the purposes of repair and reconstruction?  
And more fundamentally, should it?  The answer is it should not 
play a different role.  For the reasons discussed in Part II, the heart 
of the invention should be considered in the context of repair and 
reconstruction.  In view of Quanta, the time is ripe for the Supreme 
Court to overrule that part of Aro as well. 
 
 269 Aro, 365 U.S. at 340 (‘“The fact that an unpatented part of a combination patent may 
distinguish the invention does not draw to it the privileges of a patent.  That may be done 
only in the manner provided by law.  However worthy it may be, however essential to the 
patent, an unpatented part of a combination patent is no more entitled to monopolistic 
protection than any other unpatented device.’” (quoting Mercoid II, 320 U.S. 680, 684 
(1944))); see supra text accompanying note 136.  
 270 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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D. Addressing Criticisms of Quanta 
Quanta has its critics.  Most notably, Scott Kieff271 argues that 
the Supreme Court has revived a previously discredited doctrine: 
During the early 1900s, courts routinely focused on 
which element of a patent claim was “key” or at the 
“heart of the invention” to determine questions of 
contributory infringement, induced infringement, 
patent misuse, and antitrust.  The inquiry was so 
subjective that it became the plaything of the 
judiciary, with most courts in the early part of that 
period routinely ruling in favor of patentees on each 
issue, while most courts in the later part of the 
period routinely ruling against patentees.  One of 
the two central motivating factors behind the 
congressional decision to promulgate the 1952 
Patent Act—essentially our present patent statute—
was to statutorily jettison this entire line of cases 
and create an objective framework for determining 
patent infringement and valid patent licenses.272 
Although Kieff’s description of the motivation underlying the 
Patent Act of 1952 is generally correct, he arrives at the wrong 
conclusion because he overlooks the specific problems the 
legislation was intended to correct.  Giles Rich,273 one of the 
authors of the Patent Act of 1952, explained that section 271 was 
 
 271 Together Troy Paredes and F. Scott Kieff also filed an amicus brief in the Supreme 
Court in Quanta arguing that exhaustion should not apply to the sale of Intel’s 
processors. See generally Brief of Various Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937).  The primary argument of the brief 
and Kieff’s article is that the freedom to contract in these cases should take precedence 
over the freedom from servitudes. See generally id.; Kieff, supra note 22.  It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to fully address this argument.  But the author suggests that Kieff 
and his colleagues’ argument proves too much.  The freedom to contract argument really 
attacks the entire doctrine of patent exhaustion, not whether exhaustion should apply to 
parts whose only use is to form part of the patented invention.  That discussion needs to 
be left for another day. 
 272 Kieff, supra note 22, at 321. 
 273 Giles Rich later served as a Judge for the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and 
the Federal Circuit. History of the Federal Judiciary, Rich, Giles Sutherland, FED. JUD. 
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2002&cid=17&ctype=ac&instate=fc (last 
visited June 15, 2010).   
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enacted because “the courts [had] departed from the fundamental 
principles underlying the patent system” in two waves.274  “[T]he 
first excess was a period of undue expansion of contributory 
infringement.  The second period of excess . . . was the ever-
expanding doctrine of misuse of patents.”275  That second period 
culminated in the Mercoid decisions which effectively interpreted 
the doctrine of patent misuse to render contributory infringement 
“entirely dead.”276  As described in Part II, the Patent Act of 1952 
was a repudiation of the Mercoid decisions and thus their 
underlying rationale—in other words, the refusal to recognize the 
heart of the invention.277  Contrary to what Kieff argues, the Patent 
Act of 1952 suggests that courts should focus on the “heart of the 
invention.” 
However, the concern underlying Kieff’s complaint is 
understandable.  It may be difficult to determine when certain 
components constitute the “essential features” of a patented 
invention.278  William Rooklidge, the former President of the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, and Mansi Shah 
echo this concern and argue that identifying the “essential 
elements” is “inherently subjective.”279  They also point out that 
the Quanta decision failed to explain “how to separate the essential 
from non-essential, what the inventor actually invented from what 
she did not.”280 
 
 274 Rich, supra note 38, at 522. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. at 535–36. 
 277 See supra Part II.C. 
 278 See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that there is a “delay, uncertainty and cost” associated with determining what 
is “adequately central, or the significance of process steps” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 279 See generally William C. Rooklidge & Mansi H. Shah, Essential Features of the 
Invention: Patent Damages Reform Dead End, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (Mar. 10, 2009), 
http://www.iptoday.com/news-article.asp?id=3646&type=ip. 
 280 Id. (“The Quanta Court’s suggestion that essential elements are different from 
‘application of common processes’ or ‘the addition of standard parts,’ ‘standard 
components,’ or ‘common and noninventive’ steps suggests that the essential elements 
analysis is similar if not identical to prior art subtraction.  Not to put to fine a point on the 
matter, the Quanta Court did not set out to identify what the inventor ‘really invented’ 
and has not identified a standard remotely useful in doing so.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
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In fact, the Supreme Court analyzed a number of different 
factors to determine that Intel’s products were “essential” to the 
patented invention: 
 “[T]he Intel Products constitute a material part 
of the patented invention and all but completely 
practice the patent.”281 
 “Everything inventive about each patent is 
embodied in the Intel Products.”282 
 “The Intel Products were specifically designed 
to function only when memory or buses are 
attached.”283 
 “Quanta was not required to make any creative 
or inventive decision when it added [memory 
and buses].”284 
A review of these findings shows that the Court is engaged in 
two distinct types of analysis.  By using the terms “material part of 
the patented invention” and “specifically designed,” the first and 
third statements are applying a kind of contributory infringement 
analysis.285  The second and fourth statements suggest that the 
Court is applying a kind of patentability analysis. 
The patentability analysis leads to the question of whether the 
component has to be separately patentable to be essential.  This 
kind of analysis is dangerously complex.  On a purely logistical 
level, the inquiry asks the fact finder to determine whether a 
hypothetical claim made up of a subset of claim limitations is 
valid.  Of course validity must be judged under both 35 U.S.C § 
102 (anticipation) and § 103 (obviousness).  The same question 
may have to be repeated for various different possible 
combinations of limitations.  That could lead to multiple invalidity 
presentations.  This problem is magnified even further if several 
claims are at issue.  If the “inventiveness” issue is only one factor 
in the entire “essential elements” calculus, this leads to the very 
kind of unpredictability that worries the critics.  Thus, the Quanta 
 
 281 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2120 (2008).  
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 See supra note 37 for the text of 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006).  
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standard has the potential to become the “flock of insignificant 
standards” that concerned Justice Black in Aro.286 
The lower courts can lessen this problem by focusing on a 
contributory infringement analysis to determine whether a 
component is “essential.”287  This standard is already recognized as 
a test for determining when the heart of the invention is present.288  
Under this analysis, a component of a patented invention would be 
sufficiently essential to trigger exhaustion if the component: 1) 
constituted a material part of the invention, 2) was especially made 
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of the patent, and 
3) was not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use.289  This is essentially the test for 
contributory infringement without the intent requirement.290 
The benefit of this standard is apparent.  It avoids the critics’ 
complaint by setting forth a straightforward and objective standard.  
There have been almost fifty years of case law interpreting § 
271(c).291  Thus, courts should have no trouble applying it to the 
issue of exhaustion.  Moreover, the standard is also firmly rooted 
in both the Quanta and Univis decisions.  Therefore, the courts can 
refine the standard in a sensible way now without having to wait 
for another Supreme Court decision. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that one of the basic foundations of patent 
law should fall.  For over half a century, courts and commentators 
have said that there is no heart or gist of the invention in patent 
 
 286 See supra text accompanying notes 102–05. 
 287 This is really only a band-aid.  Unfortunately, the best solution is probably 
unrealistic.  To create a clear standard, the Supreme Court should revisit Quanta and 
repudiate its discussion of patentability as a factor in determining what are the essential 
features of the invention.   
 288 See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.  
 289 See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.  
 290 The test for contributory infringement has a knowledge requirement. See supra note 
37. 
 291 Of course, contributory infringement existed prior to the enactment of § 271 in 
1952. See generally Rich, supra note 38, at 526–30 (referencing early contributory 
infringement cases). 
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law.  However, by analyzing numerous different patent doctrines, 
this Article has shown that the conventional wisdom is wrong in 
many respects.  Depending on the label that the particular doctrine 
uses, the doctrine either relies on or rejects the heart of the 
invention. 
This Article reconciles this apparent inconsistency and 
provides an analytical framework for determining when it is 
appropriate to reject the heart of the invention and when it is not.  
When the question is whether a particular product or process falls 
within the scope of the patent, the heart of the invention is not an 
appropriate consideration and the “all elements” rule should be 
applied.  For example, the doctrines of infringement, anticipation, 
obviousness, and the written description requirement respectively 
ask if an accused product, the prior art, or an embodiment from the 
specification falls within the scope of a claim.  In those contexts, it 
is entirely appropriate to examine all the limitations together.  
However, other doctrines including repair and reconstruction, 
contributory infringement, inequitable conduct, and joint 
inventorship ask different questions and sensibly focus on part of 
the invention.  In those cases, courts should be allowed to focus on 
the heart of the invention. 
This analysis has led to several recommendations.  First, with 
respect to the specific doctrine of repair and reconstruction, the 
Supreme Court should overturn Aro and allow courts to consider 
the heart of the invention in that context. 
Second, considering the heart of the invention in the 
developing areas of patentable subject matter, the “omitted 
elements” test, and damages is entirely permissible and should 
depend on the goals of each particular doctrine. 
Third, this Article argues that the Supreme Court correctly 
decided Quanta.  Like contributory infringement, exhaustion 
necessarily looks at what elements short of the entire patented 
invention should trigger particular legal consequences.  
Consequently, exhaustion properly considers the heart of the 
invention.  However, Quanta missed the mark.  It used both 
patentability and contributory infringement principles to assess 
whether limitations are “essential.”  The lower courts should focus 
C03_CHAO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  1:01 PM 
1240 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1183 
the analysis on the contributory infringement prong which provides 
a clearer standard. 
In sum, the Supreme Court went too far when it issued Aro’s 
commandment in 1961.  Now that the Court has implicitly 
recognized the significance of the heart of the invention in Quanta, 
it is time to rethink all of Aro and explicitly recognize that the 
heart of the invention has its place in patent law. 
 
